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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the factors determining the capital structure of UK listed companies and their 
impact on different debt levels. In order to investigate the factors influencing the capital structure 
decisions, a panel data set of 191 non-financial firms across 9 different industries on FTSE350 
from 2004-2013 was analysed. Total leverage, long-term leverage and short-term leverage served 
as the dependent variables and were all computed based on their book value. The explanatory 
variables such as non-debt tax shields, profitability, size, tangibility, growth, liquidity and 
industry classification were chosen in accordance to the literature and they were thoroughly 
investigated.  Industry classification was examined by one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
while for the rest of the determinants the Fixed Effect regression model was used.  
The empirical evidences show that non-debt tax shields, profitability, tangibility, growth and 
liquidity are inversely related to total leverage, while industry classification and size are 
positively related. Therefore, this dissertation does not succeed in identifying a specific capital 
structure theory that can totally reflect on the financing decisions taken from listed firms in the 
UK. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past few decades, the capital structure theory is considered as a central and debatable 
topic in the finance field. Firms seek to identify their best possible capital structure, by 
alternating their debt and equity levels, in order to maximize their value and minimize their cost 
of capital, at the same time. A variety of theories have been introduced to investigate how the 
choice of capital structure affects the firms’ value. However, researchers have not generally 
accepted one of the investigated theories as the perfect applicable theory (Myers, 2001). The next 
part introduces few central existing capital structure theories. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) initially proposed the capital structure idea, which states that under 
perfectly efficient capital markets the value of a firm is irrelevant to its financing composition. 
The previous statement under its certain assumption has been mathematically proven and is well 
known as the two MM’s propositions, which are considered as the groundwork for the modern 
theory of capital structure. In 1963, Modigliani and Miller extended their initial capital structure 
concept by including corporation tax, which now assumes that a firm’s value is maximised by 
raising the amount of debt. Recent literature argues that MM’s propositions are not applicable in 
the real life of finance, and broadens the propositions by adding complex issues such as 
bankruptcy costs, taxes, asymmetric information and agency costs.  
In order to investigate firms’ capital structure decisions, the majority of the literature mainly 
focuses on two competing theories that are the trade-off theory and pecking order theory. The 
trade-off theory proposes that the optimal capital structure is feasible and achievable by an 
accurate management of the benefits and costs of borrowing. On the other hand, pecking order 
theory is mainly based on the information asymmetry component and suggests that firms should 
follow a financing hierarchy which has the following preference order: Initially, firms would be 
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keen to finance their investments using internally generated funds. However, if external finance 
were required, then companies would be better of by issuing debt whilst raising equity acts as the 
last choice. The concept of capital structure is then developed to incorporate other theories such 
as the agency cost theory, which arises from the conflicts of interest of debt holders - 
shareholders and managers - shareholders. The concepts of market timing and signalling are 
considered in the capital structures’ conceptual framework. However, under the scope of this 
study, none of these theories is deeply investigated.  
The above theories have been the key inspiration for many empirical researchers who seek for 
supporting evidences to explain the firms’ financing behaviour. Even so, a contradiction still 
exists on to which theory is better compared to the others since each theory offers a distinctive 
explanation under its certain assumptions. For instance, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), whose papers are considered to be crucial in the capital structure area, 
reported evidences that are consistent with the pecking order theory since an inverse relation was 
found between profitability and leverage. On the other hand, trade-off theory finds support from 
Taggart (1977) and Bradley et al (1984) whose studies concluded that firms adjust their debt ratio 
towards a target.  
While firms’ financing decisions are still unclear, it is worth to note that the majority of the 
literature focuses in explaining firms’ behaviour using data from US companies. Moreover, 
Ozkan (2001) points out that only a small number of studies have tested for determinants on the 
UK’s capital structure. Nonetheless, the studies of Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and Bennett and 
Donnelly (1993) are notable exceptions. The empirical results of these studies are without a 
doubt very important, however at least two possible drawbacks are detected. Initially, both 
studies utilised a quite old data that combined covers the period 1977-1997. In addition, their 
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econometric approach is considered to be out of date as both researchers analysed their data using 
a cross-sectional OLS model which fails to control for firm-specific time invariant heterogeneity 
(Bevan and Danbolt, 2004). Nowadays, econometric techniques offer the ability to use panel data 
analysis, which is a more complete approach than the OLS since it can take into account both 
cross-sectional and time series data information. In addition, according to Ozkan (2001) the 
implementation of both cross-sectional and firm specific effect data emphasizes the importance 
of several factors of capital structure to firms’ gearing. 
The purpose of this dissertation is capturing an up-to-date understanding of the theoretical 
determinants of the UK capital structure. This paper adopts the panel data approach using a 
sample of listed firms on the FTSE 350 index, which includes the largest 350 companies and is 
considered as one of the most important stock market indexes quoted on the London Stock 
Exchange. Moreover, the literature fails to provide a recent study and in view of the recent 
economic downturn the reliability of historical findings is questioned. Thus the chosen sample 
covers the period 2004-2013. The findings are then discussed based on the current capital 
structure theories and compared to other empirical researches. The research questions can be 
formulated as follows:  
1. What are the determinants of UK listed firms’ capital structure and how they impact on 
different debt maturity levels?  
2. Do leverage ratios considerably differ among the different industries in the UK?  
3. Which capital structure theory is the most appropriate at explaining the financing 
activities of the UK quoted firms? 
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The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive 
literature review of capital structure theories, which includes Modigliani and Miller’s theory and 
the modern theories of trade-off, pecking order and agency cost. The selected theoretical 
determinants of capital structure are thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides the 
formulation of the dependent and independent variables. In addition, this chapter describes the 
method used for collecting the data and the econometric models employed in this study.  In 
Chapter 5, the empirical evidences from running the regression models are analysed and a 
discussion on the findings is provided. A summary of the results alongside with limitations and 
future recommendations are covered in Chapter 6.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Modigliani and Miller’s Propositions (I & II) 
In 1958, Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, two well-known academic researchers, proposed 
the pioneer concept of capital structure, which is considered as the origin to the modern 
philosophy of capital structure. The key idea behind their study was to identify whether firms’ 
value was affected by their decisions taken for financing. Under the central assumption of perfect 
capital market existence where corporate taxes, bankruptcy costs and transaction costs among 
others are not included, they argued that a firms’ value is irrelevant to its leverage ratio 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963). Additionally, Modigliani and Miller assumed that potential 
investors could borrow and lend under the same rate. Although both assumptions are not 
applicable in reality, there is still a number of economists, who follow this pathway in which 
capital structure concepts must be offered under particular market conditions (Harris and Raviv, 
1991).  
Under the perfect market hypothesis, two propositions have been developed and are explained in 
the next section. 
2.1.1 Proposition I 
Proposition I states that a firms’ value is unrelated to its capital structure. This proposition claims 
that regardless of the gearing ratio, the cost of equity of firms is unchanged over the time horizon. 
In other words, Proposition I states that under the certain assumption of perfect market 
environment, a firm’s true value remains unchanged to any variation on the proportions of debt 
and equity, therefore it follows that the weighted cost of capital (WACC) remains unaffected. 
Moreover, a research on Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I conducted by Harvey (2004) 
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stated “A firm cannot change the total value of its outstanding securities by changing its capital 
structure proportions”. Furthermore, Brealey et al. (2011) indicated that according to Proposition 
I, a firm’s total value is not affected, only if its cash flows are diversified into different streams. 
2.1.2 Proposition 2 
Proposition II suggests that when a firm’s leverage ratio increases (decreases), then the cost of 
equity increases (decreases) as well. In other words, a positive relation exists between the 
shareholders’ expected return and leverage ratio. According to Megginson et al (2007), this linear 
relationship between the required return rate and the debt to equity ratio arises from the fact that 
investors expect higher returns from their anticipation on an investment with higher risk 
associated with borrowing debt. In conclusion, Proposition II is an extension of Proposition I in a 
way that any alternations on a firm’s gearing ratio can be reimburse by modifying the cost of 
equity, therefore the WACC still remains unaffected (APPENDIX 1).  
Few years later, in 1963, Modigliani and Miller extended their initial proposals by adding 
corporate tax in their model, considering the present value of the annual interest tax shield as tax 
deductible. This new theory proposes that a firm’s value will increase by the tax advantage from 
borrowing, resulting to a decline in WACC (Megginson et al., 2007).  In more details, the 
government considers income tax as a non-direct financial support to firms, whilst debt interest 
payments are expenses before tax, therefore the value of a firm increases when debt’s percentage 
becomes higher. Consequently, in the view of the fact that a firm’s market value increases when 
gearing ratio increases, a firm’s optimal capital structure will be a structure that relies solely on 
debt (Brealey et al., 2011) (APPENDIX 2). 
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Later on, Miller (1977) included personal income tax to the already existing corporate tax model 
and his findings confirmed that the existing tax model miscalculates the advantage of debt 
financing. Furthermore, he explained that a balance exist between the benefit from corporate tax 
and the loss from personal income tax, therefore his study reverts back to the original irrelevance 
theory. 
In overall, Modigliani and Miller’s theory composes a fundamental and strong base to the 
breakdown of corporate finance and more precisely of the capital structure topic. Although, their 
theory is considered as the groundwork of this field, it is also a topic to lots of controversy and 
scepticism. It appears that their initial perfect market condition, which is not realistic, is inspiring 
a number of academic and empirical researchers to contradict the two propositions. According to 
Brealey et al (2011), in reality Proposition I & II fail to include several significant aspects, such 
as bankruptcy costs, transaction costs, financial distress and other market imperfections. To sum 
up the MM’s theory, none of their models stands in the reality of the world, but both are only 
applicable in an ideal planet.   
Following MM’s theory, economic researchers started broadening the original models by adding 
more real life factors, which have been constantly verified to influence a firm’s leverage. For 
instance, Myers and Majluf (1984), Myers (1984) and Myers (1977) suggested adopting the 
asymmetric information element, transaction costs and costs of financial distress, respectively. 
Two challenging theories are mainly tested by the literature in order to investigate the firms’ 
financing decisions. One is the trade-off theory and the other is the pecking order theory.   
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2.2 Trade-off theory 
As mentioned above, MM’s theory pays no attention to the real world complexities. Factors such 
as bankruptcy costs and financial distress are ignored (Myers, 1977). These elements could 
crucially outweigh the tax advantage from borrowing and therefore a balance point would exist, 
where the value of firms is maximized. This point is usually referred to as the optimal point of 
capital structure. According to the trade-off theory, when a firm’s borrowings exceed a specific 
point, then the firm will come up against the risk of financial distress (Myers, 1984). In other 
words, when a firm increases its borrowings, the cost of debt will increase while advantages from 
borrowing will decrease. Financial distress is a situation in which firms are not able to meet their 
responsibilities to creditors. According to Brealey et al. (2011), when firms have high fixed costs, 
illiquid assets or revenues that can be vulnerable to business recessions, then there is a higher risk 
for a financial distress to occur. As a result, firms seek for a sensible gearing ratio (Myers, 2001). 
Trade-off theory claims that firms’ proportions of debt and equity are based on the trade-off 
between costs of financial distress and benefit from tax savings of debt, in a way that an ultimate 
amount of debt is attained when the advantages and disadvantages of borrowing funds are 
completely balanced (Ross et al. 2008). Therefore, as Myers (1984, 2001) stated, owing to a risk 
of further financial distress costs, risky and low profitability firms appear to have lower debt level 
than wealthy and high profitability companies.  
2.2.1 Tax advantage of debt 
Probably the most significant feature that was included in Modigliani and Miller’s theory was the 
incorporation of tax (Brealey et al, 2011). Moreover, it is contended that the use of tax reduction 
strategy as a way for approximating corporate taxable earnings emerges quite frequently in many 
different financial systems. Since companies’ interest compensation is considered as a tax-
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deductible expense, then highly profitable firms would take full advantage of their tax shield by 
borrowing as much as possible and consequently increase their value. The term tax-shield could 
be described as the variation between the sum of taxes paid by a levered firm and an unlevered 
firm (Wrightsman, 1978). 
Although Modigliani and Miller’s model takes into account the corporate tax, a new modified 
model that considered the effect of corporate tax on capital structure’s choice is later offered and 
is currently broadly used.  
          
Where 
                                
  = Value of a levered firm 
  = Value of an unlevered firm 
It can be seen from the above equation that among the present value of tax shield and the value of 
a levered firm there is a positive linear connection. As previously pointed out, the value of a 
levered firm is maximized, when the amount of borrowings is increased since tax shield would 
increase too. Consequently, a firm’s optimal capital structure would be attained, when a firm is 
solely financed by debt. Academics such as Trezevant (1992) and Bradley et al. (1984), after 
observing large firms’ gearing ratio reaction to changes in corporate tax, found evidences that 
support this claim.  
In contrast, the above statement has been under a lot of controversy and scepticism by a number 
of empirical researchers (Scott, 1976). Miller (1977) in his research found evidences that 
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contradict the above statement. He argued that by increasing the level of debt, firms would raise 
concerns of increased bankruptcy costs and greater financial distress risk, if their normal 
activities do not generate enough funds to meet their debt requirements. Specifically, his research 
is based on low levered firm’s functionality, in which the tax advantage from borrowing is large 
compared to the bankruptcy costs, providing the famous quote “horse and rabbit stew – one horse 
and one rabbit” (Miller 1977, p.264).   
Furthermore, personal tax and bankruptcy costs are crucial concerns that need to be dealt with. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) placed the issue of personal tax underlying its significance, which 
leads to the distinction among the income tax on interest and the personal income tax on capital 
growth, with the condition of securities to be owned by investors. Moreover, Miller (1977) 
incorporated personal tax to the already existing corporate tax model and concluded that a 
balance position exists in the financial system where the benefit from tax shield at corporate level 
is counteracted by the personal income tax paid by the debt holders. Consequently, equity holders 
would apparently demand a higher interest to reimburse their loss in net proceeds, due to the 
personal income tax limitation (Graham, 2003). Therefore, from firms’ perspective, the benefit 
that occurs from raising debt (i.e. the tax shield) is in fact eliminated due the required higher 
premium on debt. Debt’s treatment is normally disproportionate between corporate tax, which is 
usually positively correlated, and personal income tax, which at the most times is negatively 
related.  
In addition, a crucial aspect in exploring firms’ financing composition is the current tax system, 
where firms are undertaking their activities. For instance, in South Korea, according to Ang and 
Jung (1993), firms’ financing composition is in favour of borrowing instead of using any other 
external finance. Furthermore, a study conducted by Adedeji (1998) verified that investment and 
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dividend payout ratio have a negative relation. Nevertheless, Adedeji’s conclusion is not 
confirmed in every country. For example, in UK there is no significance correlation between 
gearing ratio and any investing outlay. Borrowing is strongly recommended in the UK, thus UK’s 
taxation in fact differs from the US system (Ashton, 1989). Consequently, tax benefit decreases 
for the reason that under the UK imputation system, dividend can be compensated in opposition 
to tax liability (King, 1974). Hence, the probability of UK companies to be financed with 
externally generated funds is huge.  
Additionally, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) introduced corporate tax shield alternatives for debt 
such as depreciation deductions, investment tax credits and depletion allowances, which are all 
regarded as non-debt tax shields. They argued that companies are likely to have an increased cost 
of debt, because boosting their capital structure with debt will obviously diminish the marginal 
corporate tax benefit due to the present of high non-debt tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 
1980). In most cases, debt and non-debt tax shields ought to be negatively related and therefore it 
is believed that firms have a unique interior equilibrium point, which theoretically should be the 
optimum leverage decision. 
2.2.2 Bankruptcy Costs and Financial Distress 
The corporate tax model of capital structure proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1963) is 
essentially created and supported on the basis of a perfect capital market where a firm’s optimal 
market value can be attained by using 100% debt financing, due to the tax shield advantage. 
However, the perfect market conditions do not reflect the reality of the world and are only 
applicable in an idyllic business environment. In addition, a high gearing ratio may incur 
additional risk related to the ability of firms on repaying their debt. Thus, companies could be 
exposed to the danger of financial distress, especially during economic downturns. A 
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confirmation of the above statement is given by the study of Myers (1977), in which he 
concluded that companies have a tendency on limiting their debt. He argued that due bankruptcy 
costs and risk of financial distress, taking loans would be a more expensive way financing a 
company.  Bankruptcy costs imply a decline on a firm’s assets value; thereby their possession is 
transferred from the stockholders to the bondholders. Moreover, according to Cornelli and Felli 
(1995) the bankruptcy effect might take place before actually the firm being bankrupted. 
Furthermore, bankruptcy costs are sustainable even in the case where companies are under the 
pressure of financial distress, even though this might not occur at the end (Robicheck and Myers, 
1966).  Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Bierman and Thomas (1972) and Baxter (1967) also 
supported this declaration.  
According to the studies of Warner (1977), Barclay et al (2006) and Megginson et al. (2007), the 
magnitude of financial distress cost is divided into two categories, namely direct and indirect 
costs. The first category of direct costs arises throughout the procedure of bankruptcy and 
reorganization. This procedure includes costs such as legal and administrative fees of the 
liquidation, costs of closing down company’s activities and disposing assets. These consequences 
occur because in the case of a bankrupted company, shareholders have little scope into efficiently 
organizing the firm. In addition, moral hazard, contracting and monitoring may also be 
incorporated to direct costs (Myers, 1984). In contrast, the indirect costs’ determination is far 
more demanding. In fact, indirect costs have a more crucial effect than the direct costs (Berk and 
DeMarzo, 2007). The indirect costs are usually linked with the decline in investing activities that 
is associated with the failure of firms to raise new funds. Indirect costs also include product-
market problems such as reduced advertisement, reductions in the number of employees, 
suppliers and customers and a fall in the firm’s market share value due to worsened product 
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quality. Moreover, opponents are becoming more challenging. According to Brealey and Myers 
(2002), indirect costs are often arisen from the fact that other parties are reluctant to conduct 
business dealings with a potential financial distressed company. In addition, Berk and DeMarzo 
(2007) pointed out that shareholder, debt holders and equity holders wealth would be diminish in 
the existence of financial distress risk. Consequently, before finalising capital structure 
propositions, firms are recommended to adopt and consider the financial distress risk (Myers, 
1984, Titman and Wessels, 1988 and Fama and French, 2002). 
Furthermore, according to Myers (1984) there is a ‘debt overhang’ problem existence, which 
occurs in the case where a firm owns a risk of failure on its debt repayment and the requisite in 
the associated contract provides current debt holders the right for the settlement, which will be 
harmful to the shareholders. This is caused by the fact that debt holders will receive appraisal 
from the newly produced investments by paying a lower credit risk associated with the 
outstanding debt at time. Thus, boosting up the risk of debt default will impact the contract as to 
become stricter. As Myers (1977) and Calomiris et al. (1995) pointed out, the above condition 
adds further concerns on the underinvestment problem, since firms are obligated to follow the 
covenants. Therefore, firms may quit from their profitable investments. As a result, risky firms 
are likely to consist of assets with high market value volatility, which guides the firms to a higher 
risk of financial distress. According to Bradley et al. (1984) the gearing ratio of these firms is 
smaller, thus a negative relationship between bankruptcy cost and gearing ratio exists.  
2.2.3 Optimal capital structure 
Since Modigliani and Miller’s preliminary capital structure irrelevance theory, taking into 
account the effect of tax shields and financial distress provides a better and more understandable 
view on the modern corporate financing policy. Normally, optimal capital structure point is 
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accessible by balancing the advantages and shortcomings of debt. Optimal capital structure’s 
background originates from the works of Baxter (1967), Robichek and Myers (1966) and 
Bierman and Thomas (1972). Later on, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Lloyd-Davies (1975) and 
Scott (1976) officially proposed the optimal capital structure model. Finally Myers (1984) 
pioneered a more complete view of the static (trade-off) theory.  
According to the static theory, adding more debt to a firm’s capital structure composition can 
potentially increase its value. However, at the same time the risk of financial distress for firms 
also increases, with the event of bankruptcy being closer than before. Subject to the experience of 
bankruptcy, a firm’s value declines because it will suffer additional costs for the emergence of 
financial distress, even in the case where bankruptcy may not occur. Moreover, trade-off theory 
claims that an equilibrium point exists, where benefits (tax shield) and disadvantages (financial 
distress) of employing debt are balanced and at this point the optimal structure is indicated. In 
summary, the static trade-off theory can be modelled as follows, where the value of a levered 
firm is explained by three factors (Brealey et al 2011, Robicheck and Myers, 1966).  
         (          )    (                          ) 
The above equation indicates that firms can achieve their optimal capital structure, when 
marginal value of interest tax shields completely offsets the present value of financial distress 
costs (Myers, 2001). Therefore, equity should be replaced by debt until the firms’ value reaches 
the best possible point. Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the trade-off theory. 
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As figure 3 shows that when firms start to borrow their value rises by an amount equal to the 
present value of the tax advantage. During that period, the benefit from tax shields is 
predominated, as the risk of financial distress is still neglectable (Myers and Allen, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the risk of default and thus the possibility financial distress significantly rises, 
when firms start to borrow more. Consequently, firms’ value declines since the advantage from 
tax-shields would then be completely offset by the costs of financial distress. 
From Figure 3, it is also worth noting that in the lack of adjustment costs or transaction costs, 
each firm’s optimal capital structure is determined by its debt-to-value ratio (Myers, 1984). 
However as a matter of fact, transaction costs and adjustment costs always exist, thus this appears 
to prevent companies from altering their financial leverage ratio toward their objectives. 
Figure 3 Trade-off theory of Capital Structure (Myers, 1984) 
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Therefore, as Myers (1984) pointed out, a gap is likely to exist among the current and the optimal 
firms’ financing composition.  
2.2.4 Limitation of trade-off theory 
Apparently, not all academics recognize the trade-off theory as the most appropriate theory for 
explaining capital structure, since some shortcomings come along with its assumptions.  
I. Is the hypothesis of negative relation between leverage and profitability correct?  
 According to the trade-off theory, high profitability firms are less likely to be exposed to 
financial distress risks and as a result their bankruptcy costs are expected to be lower. These 
kinds of firms are advised to make use of the extra debt in order to benefit from tax-shields. In 
addition, these firms have frequent access to higher free cash flows and thus they are committed 
to a higher chance of ‘overinvesting’. Consequently, in order to reduce the negative effect (see 
agency costs theory) of ‘overinvesting’, these firms tend to borrow more. In contrast, vast 
majority of the literature show that a negative relation exists between leverage and profitability 
(Hall et al.2004).  
II. Why firms keep a conservative character when they employ debt?  
The central proposition in trade-off theory is the argument of optimal capital structure, which in 
general states that managers are required to trade-off between the tax-shield benefit and the 
financial distress shortcoming of borrowing. However, a number of studies on this topic revealed 
that firms would be better of by borrowing more in order to receive the tax advantage, because in 
reality firms’ bankruptcy costs are minor compared to the fairly high interest on corporate income 
tax (Maksimovic and Phillips, 1998). On the other hand, according to Graham (2000), high 
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profitable firms own a relatively small debt ratio, while high corporate tax companies apply a 
conservative character on borrowings. 
2.3 Pecking order theory  
Originally introduced by the work of Donaldson (1961), pecking order theory is usually referred 
to as the rival theory of trade-off. Later on, Myers and Majluf (1984) developed the pecking order 
theory as to include the asymmetric information component among investors. The theory 
indicates a certain financing hierarchy that firms tend to follow as a technique to avoid further 
transaction costs. Firstly, Myers (1984) argued that due to the arisen of costs associated to 
information asymmetries, companies tend to use internally generated funds instead of external 
finance, when it comes to decide about financing a prospective investment. In the case where 
internal funds are not sufficient, firms’ next option is to use less risky and hybrid securities, such 
as convertible bonds. Myers (1984) mentioned that when companies consider for external 
financing, they have a preference to debt rather than equity due to less transaction costs 
associated with debt. Hence, firms with high profitability would rely on their retained surplus and 
in the case where external funds are required then these firms are likely to choose to borrow 
funds rather than issue equity. In fact, raising equity comes as the last option for firms, since 
share price can be easily influenced by the asymmetric information between investors and 
companies. A number of empirical researches, such as Heinkel and Zechner (1990), followed the 
work of Myers and Majluf (1984), offering the topic a more comprehensive view by providing 
similar results. In contradiction, many authors disagreed with the statement of financing 
hierarchy by arguing that it is completely useless. They suggested that a better mix of financing 
choice might be the solution to the underinvestment problem. The rest of this section attempts to 
enrich the theoretical understanding of pecking order theory.  
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2.3.1 The information asymmetry 
As mentioned above, pecking order theory assumes the existence of asymmetric information, 
which gives birth to what is known as adverse selection model (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Generally, adverse selection model proposes that managers usually have more information about 
the financial condition of a company than outside investors do. In fact, accurate information is 
only well known to debtors, who look for financing a scheme. Essentially, if investors were able 
to know the true quality of borrowers, then they would be at an advantage in any way. However, 
due to moral hazard, honestly swapping information becomes very tricky (Leland and Pyle, 
1977). Several reasons can be given to explain this phenomenon. Initially, giving away honest 
information about the true value and the type of the forthcoming investment could be harmful to 
entrepreneurs’ profit. Secondly, spending a significant amount of money to third persons in order 
to retrieve this information could result to a failure. Nevertheless, the occurrence of informational 
swap is required, in order for a good quality investment to be financed. As Leland and Pyle 
(1977) pointed out, even in the case where direct information is not available, private information 
could be exposed if the debtors’ activities could be examined. 
Several empirical researches discriminated between two different views of investigating the 
private information obsessed by managers. Ross (1997) and Leland and Pyle (1977) mentioned in 
their studies that a firm’s decision for its capital structure composition is actually a signal to 
outside equity holders, who are indicated with the information asymmetry. The second view is 
given by the work of Myers and Majluf (1984), who assumed that capital structure is manipulated 
in a way that the negative effects from information asymmetry are avoided. Leland and Pyle 
(1977) supported their argument by offering an observable pattern of disclosure requirements. 
Their example showed that both entrepreneurs’ and firms’ motivation to invest their own funds 
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into a project with private information, in reality is a signal to the lending market about the true 
quality and the future prospects of the project, thus allowing investors to appraise a more accurate 
view on the true value of the project. However, Graham and Harvey’s (2001) study showed that 
debt policy is influenced by aspects reliable to signalling only on a small number of their 
experimental sample.  
Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Brennan and Schwartz (1988) supported that the convertible 
nature of debt is comparatively non-sensitive to asymmetric information that could signal the risk 
of the firm. In fact, Graham and Harvey’s (2001) study found that the issue of convertible bonds 
is a very familiar method among firms in order to attract investors, who are uncertain about the 
riskiness of the corporation. 
2.3.2 The pecking order theory of finance 
As already mentioned, pecking order theory promotes internally generated funds (i.e. retained 
earnings) as the most preferable way to finance a company’s existing assets and growth 
opportunities, when additional financing is required.  Due to information asymmetry existence 
between firms’ insiders and outside investors, external financing could be very costly and 
harmful to a company’s future plans. The pecking order model assumes that firms do not aim to 
achieve a specific leverage ratio, but instead the theory demonstrates that firms’ capital structure 
choice tends to follow a desired financing hierarchy. In particular, this hierarchy is exercised in 
order to utilise a pecking order of financing resources so that firms cope with the adverse 
selection problem; in a way that the least risky resource is the most preferable. The theory reveals 
that the supply of funds can be done either internally or externally. Internally generated funds are 
achieved through retained earnings, whereas external finance is deviated and obtained through 
debt and equity. The initial work on pecking order theory was done by Donalson (1961), which 
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explores a large sample of companies and found evidences that proved the financing hierarchy. In 
addition, Donalson (1961) argued that in most cases where internal funds are insufficient, firms 
would use the safest type of debt securities rather than decreasing the dividends. In the following 
part the study considers and clarifies the reasons behind the financing hierarchy. 
Firstly, internally generated funds are more desirable since firms are not obligated to issue any 
kind of securities and therefore they can avoid issuing costs associated with securities. Issuing 
costs include transaction costs such as administrative, underwriting and under valuing of the new 
securities (Myers, 1984). Flotation costs and costs of disclosing the firm’s proprietary financial 
information are also incorporated to issuing costs. However, these costs are not really essential 
enough to compensate the advantages of debt financing. Perhaps the second dispute, which is 
based on information asymmetry, is far more important than the issuing costs. According to 
Myers and Majluf (1984), information asymmetry is better developed during perfect and semi-
strong efficient market environments, thus potential investors are less informed than the 
managers and they will face several difficulties. Hence, firms will be probably forced to attach a 
lower price on their trading shares than their ‘true’ value. The study of Asquith and Mullins 
(1986) suggested that by the time of the stock issue declaration, the stock price is automatically 
reduced by approximately 3% of its pre-issue price. Moreover, since the intension of managers 
should be to maximize the value of the existing shareholders, then potential shareholders would 
require a discounted share price once they recognise this fact. In the case where private 
information is not in the favour of managers, then firms would always issue new securities. In the 
opposite case, firms might have to give up any beneficial prospective investments (Myers, 1984). 
As a result, the declaration of new equity issuance will offer shocking news to investors if 
managers choose to perform in this way. As a result, asymmetric information element is followed 
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by higher issue costs for riskier securities. Hence, companies prioritize their sources of financing, 
initially preferring to rely on internally generated funds, since it is cheaper and does not send a 
signal to existing and potential shareholders. Therefore, an inverse relationship exists between 
profitability and financial leverage (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1998). 
Nevertheless, this is not always the case. In many occasions, such as in small or less profitable 
firms, it is very common that internally generated funds are not enough to finance their 
prospective projects, therefore this kind of firms need to seek for other external sources of 
finance, such as debt or equity. In this case, the signalling effects associated with external finance 
should be considered. Pecking order theory suggests that issuing debt is preferred to equity issue, 
since less asymmetric information is attached to this method. According to Frank and Goyal 
(2002), the combination between not raising equity with firms’ standard activity, results to a 
balance between the financing deficit and the net debt issued. In other words, firms tend to use 
the safest type of securities first. In addition, increasing the debt proportion may signal managers 
to be more confident about foreseeable opportunities, since they consider the current share price 
as mispriced. Lastly, equity financing is only considered in the case where issuing debt could 
become very costly, as issuing equity exposes the managers’ consideration about the future of the 
company. 
According to Brealey et al. (2011), the pecking order theory of corporate financing can be briefly 
summarised as follows: 
I. Internal funds are more preferred than external financing.  
II. The dividend payout ratio is adjusted depending on the prospective projects and at the 
same time trying to keep it unchanged. 
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III. Sometimes, internally generated cash flow either overcomes or surrenders capital 
expenditures. If it is more, the surplus is not used to repurchase or retire equity. It is used 
to pay off debt or invest in marketable securities. If it is less, the firm cuts down its cash 
balance or sells its marketable securities. 
IV. In the case where companies require external funds, then they first consider the safest 
securities. So, debt is always at first place followed by hybrid securities such as 
convertible bond and lastly comes equity issue. 
On the one hand, pecking order theory found support from a number of empirical and academic 
researchers. For example, Pinegar and Wilbritch (1989) conducted a study on the capital structure 
theory and by interviewing CFOs from Fortune 500 firms they found evidences that managers 
have a preference to act in favour of the financing hierarchy. Hittle and Haddad (1992), Baskin 
(1989), Taggart (1986) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) are among the studies, which 
supported the pecking order theory. On the other hand, some scholars differentiated from pecking 
order theory. They supported that a better mix of sources exists and could be a solution to the 
underinvestment problem. For instance, Brennan and Kraus (1987) characterized that a more 
suitable financial strategy can help to prevail over the adverse selection problem caused by 
information asymmetry that maintain firm from raising equity to finance positive net present 
value projects. Some other researchers attained mix results. Fama and French (2002) tested the 
two main competing theories and found that corporations with high profitability have a tendency 
to own low debt levels, thus confirming the pecking order theory. In addition, they also found 
that companies with high levels of investing activities tend to follow the trade-off model. 
In any way, several shortcomings are attached to pecking order theory. Firstly, the pecking order 
model, in contrast to the trade-off one, does not feature several aspects that can affect a firm’s 
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debt ratio such as corporate tax, bankruptcy costs and financial distress. Furthermore, the theory 
appears to neglect the importance of the agency costs in an environment where firm has 
excessively free cash flow.  
2.4 Agency Cost Theory  
Despite the fact that extra leverage attracts a huge tax benefit, still a number of researchers 
believe that bankruptcy costs and financial distress risk, which are quoted in the trade-off theory, 
are not enough to outweigh the value of tax shields, thus agency theory is set to characterize 
another set of aspects which are opposed to the tax advantage from borrowing. Agency theory 
was first established by the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976).  The theory arises from the 
separation of capital structure management (i.e. ownership and control) and considers the 
conflicts of interests between managers and debt holders to shareholders.  
2.4.1 Conflict between shareholders and managers 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) managers and especially CEOs may act in their own 
benefit instead of making value-maximizing investments for the firm. Later on, Jensen (1986) 
incorporated the problem of agency costs in his free cash flow theory, which states that 
managers’ individual concern is motivated by a mixture of issues such as the share ownership 
and the compensation scheme.  Jensen (1986) nominated the use of debt as a solution to the 
agency problem, since increasing borrowings obligate firms to reimburse cash. Thus, managers 
are then forced to act in a way that meeting firm’s debt obligation should be their primary target, 
leaving them with fewer amounts of free cash available to pursuit in their own benefit. An 
alternative promising solution that could comfort in lessening managers and shareholders’ 
conflicts is to increase managers’ stake portion (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lasfer, 1995). 
Firms, which perform this technique, not only constraint their managers’ pursue for personal 
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interest, but also reassure that managers perform in accordance with the firm’s value-maximizing 
expectations.  
2.4.2 Conflict between shareholders and debt holders 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) first noted that manager’s behaviour favours equity value 
maximization instead of total firm value maximization. Particularly, levered firms’ managers 
who strictly operate in the stockholders’ interest will select more risk-involved investments over 
securer ones as these investments will provide huge earnings for stockholders if they are 
accomplished and if they are not, then failure costs will be tolerated by the debt holders (Harris 
and Raviv, 1991). In fact, according to Myers (2001) an extra motive for managers to act in 
favour of shareholders is the high risk of default. Consequently, managers may even accept and 
undertake negative net present value (NPV) projects, hoping that a success will save the firm 
from bankruptcy. However, in the case of failure the shareholders’ optimum decision is to let the 
firm go bankrupt, which can occurred by exercising their valuable limited liability, and thus load 
the bankruptcy effects on debt holders, since equity is a residual claim. As a result, both 
outcomes are actually in the favour of shareholders.  
On the other hand, rational debt holders are totally aware of this sub-optimal investment 
behaviour of managers, thus as compensation they request higher risk premium by demanding 
higher interest repayments. Consequently, a firm’s desire to borrow is reduced due to the higher 
cost of debt. Furthermore, Myers (1977) indicated that under the underinvestment hypothesis 
higher costs are associated with debt because of growing risk, therefore any positive investment 
returns are divided between both shareholders and debt holders. Subsequently, highly levered 
firms even reject positive NPV investments because any gains from such investments are 
accumulated to debt holders. Brealey et al (2011) added some other issues to the existing 
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literature. For instance, he pointed out that there is a possibility for a company to manipulate its 
financial statements in order to postpone bankruptcy, which extinguishes the bondholders’ 
claimable value once the firm go bankrupt.  
2.5 Other Capital Structure theories  
Majority of the literature is concentrated on examining the two main and famous competing 
theories.  Apart from these two main theories and the agency cost theory, which is already 
discussed above, there are many other theories. Signalling theory, which was first developed by 
Ross (1977), is debating the firm’s real value and investment opportunities, basing its argument 
on the information asymmetry between inside stuff and outside investors (Leland and Pyle, 
1977). In more detail, since markets are channelled by different market values from different 
capital structures due to information asymmetry, the signalling theory claims that capital 
structure is manipulated by firms’ internal stuff in order to send a positive valuable signal to 
potential investing outsiders (Walton and Aerts, 2006).  Hence, investors are actually fooled by 
the firm, since investors regard higher levered firms as higher quality firms, whose debt 
obligations can meet easily (John, 1987). As a result, numerous quoted companies employ high 
debt ratio as to lure any potential investors in their future plans.   
Baker and Wurgler (2002) firstly proposed the market timing idea. The key idea of market timing 
theory is that managers constantly have an eye on the existing environment of both debt and 
equity markets, so that if external finance is required, they instantly signify the most favourable 
market to refer. Financial managers may decide not to issue any type of external finance, if all 
market conditions are unattractive. Nonetheless, in the extreme case where a market condition is 
unexpectedly beneficial, firms may decide to go for external finance even if they do not actually 
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require any. Consequently, both debt and equity market conditions are considered to have a vital 
effect on capital structure decisions.  
Table 1 Summary of theories and their impact on Capital Structure 
Theory 
Summary of the theory’s impact on Capital Structure 
 
 
 
Modigliani and 
Miller (1958, 1963) 
 
(1958) Under the perfect capital market hypothesis 
Proposition I: A firm’s value does not differ with the financing decisions, thus 
WACC remains unaffected. 
Proposition II: Any variations of debt-to-equity ratio can be compensated by 
the change of cost of equity, thus keeping WACC unaffected. 
(1963) Corporate tax addition, considering debt interest payments as tax 
deductible. A firm that uses debt financing, increases its value by the PV of tax 
shield, resulting to a decrease in WACC 
 
 
Trade-off Theory 
 
An optimal capital structure exists at the point where the tax advantage (tax 
shields) of debt is completely offset by both bankruptcy and financial distress 
costs  
 
 
Pecking Order 
Theory 
 
The theory is based on the information asymmetry element and claims that firms 
follow a particular financing hierarchy where firms prefer internal finance. If 
external financing is needed firm seek first for safest security that is debt and 
equity is raised as the last option. 
 
 
Agency Cost Theory 
 
The theory suggests that raising debt is likely to reduce any potential conflicts 
between managers and shareholders, however this is not the case to reduce any 
potential conflicts between shareholders and debt holders 
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3. Theoretical Determinants of Capital Structure  
In Chapter 2, the most important theories on capital structure have been revised. In order to test 
the empirical strength of the above theories, academics have been examined and discussed 
several determinants that could have an influence on firm’s financing decisions. However, as the 
literature suggested, it is almost impossible to explain the firms’ structure by considering only 
one theory. In this chapter, the theoretical determinants selected for this study and their possible 
influences on firms’ borrowing decisions are briefly discussed. 
3.1 Non-Debt Tax Shields (NDTS) 
The significance of tax shields in determining firms’ debt proportions has been considered since 
the early work of Modigliani and Miller (1963), which reflects on the tax deductibility of interest 
associated with debt. However, later on, De Angelo and Masulis (1980) in their paper 
incorporated other corporate tax shields substitutes for debt financing such as accounting 
depreciation expenses and investment tax credits and they concluded that a negative relation 
exists between non-debt tax shields and the gearing ratio which is in accordance with the 
prediction of trade-off theory. In other words this means that companies with large non-debt tax 
shields do not seek for debt financing (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). Ross (1985), Titman and Wessels (1988), Bennett and Donnelly (1993) and 
Ozkan (2001) also found supporting evidences for the De Angelo and Masulis (1980) hypotheses. 
Nonetheless, Ross (1985) pointed out that in the case where companies have extreme debt 
proportions and are not capable of seizing all their possible tax shields, they might convert to 
‘tax-exhausted’ firms.  
Conversely, Bradley et al. (1984) found a positive relation between leverage and non-debt tax 
shields. More precisely, Scott (1977) and Moore (1986) claim that companies with excessively 
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high non-debt tax shields are likely to possess a substantial number of collateral assets that can be 
used to secure debt, which is less risky, and therefore they assume a positive relation between 
non-debt tax shields and leverage.  
Measuring the effect of non-debt tax shields can be calculated by several methods. In line with 
previous studies, this thesis also uses the ratio of annual depreciation over totals assets (Wald, 
1999; Claplinsky and Niehaus, 1993; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Ozkan, 2001). It is believed that 
this is the most appropriate measure since it captures one of the most important tax shields, which 
is available for almost all companies. Different companies follow different business strategies, as 
a result the use of a different measurement for non-debt tax shields nay generate bias results.  
3.2 Profitability              
Profitability is considered as one of the most key measures for every firm since it signifies both 
firm’s performance and efficiency. Nonetheless, profitability still creates a lot of controversy 
between academics as to its relation to leverage. MM’s theory states that due to the tax 
advantage, firms would be better of by using debt financing. Consequently, high profitable firms 
seek for debt, as this would improve their tax shield benefit.  
Trade-off theory and agency cost theory have been the supporting theories for researchers who 
concluded that a positive relation exists between profitability and leverage. Trade-off theory 
claims that higher earning firms are less expected to suffer from financial distress, thus a lower 
risk of bankruptcy is attached to such firms as they are more likely to honour their debt 
obligations. In addition, high profitable firms have more encouragements to employ debt since 
this would maximize their interest tax shield, at an attractive cost (Frank and Goyal, 2003). From 
the agency cost perspective, an increase in the firm’s debt level limits the availability of 
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excessive free cash flow, which could be used by managers to pursue their own interest (Jensen, 
1986). Furthermore, Rajan and Zingales (1995) reported a positive relation between profitability 
and leverage for firms in the UK.  They stated that equity finance counts foremost of the 
financing activities in the UK and therefore high profitable firms with less growth opportunities 
would decrease equity issue which implies the positive relation between leverage and profit.  
In contrast, pecking order theory implies a negative relation between profitability and gearing 
ratio. Generally, the theory, which is based on the asymmetric information element and its 
adverse selection consequences, proposes a financing hierarchy where internally generated funds 
are preferred to debt, which in turn is preferred to equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Accordingly, 
highly profitable firms are less likely to employ any type of external finance since they would be 
better of by relying on their retained earnings, thus they have a lower leverage ratio. Most of the 
empirical investigation from researchers supports this negative relation. For instance, Bennett and 
Donnelly (1983) and Ozkan (2001) tested the firms in the UK and located a negative relation. 
However, more recently Panno’s (2003) study on UK’s and Italian’s listed firms found a positive 
relationship between profitability and leverage, for both countries.  This thesis uses return on 
total assets, which is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes over total assets 
(Ozkan, 2001). 
3.3 Size 
The effects of firm’s size on the gearing ratio are debatable among academics. Different scholars 
suggested that size’s effect could be either negative or positive related with firm’s leverage. On 
the one hand, according to Titman and Wessels (1988) large firms are likely to be more 
diversified than small firms, which therefore makes such firms hardly to go bankrupt. In fact, 
debt issuers have more to worry when they come to decide on investing in small firms. In 
 35 
addition, Warner (1977) claimed that smaller firms are subject to higher costs of bankruptcy, 
since bankruptcy costs might moderately affected by economies of scale. Ang et al. (1982), who 
evidentially proved an inverse relation between size and bankruptcy costs, also supported 
Warner’s findings. Moreover, larger firms are less likely to incur agency costs related to debt, 
since they have a much better status in the debt markets (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Furthermore, 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) suggested that lower agency and monitoring costs are committed to 
large firms, thus these firms rely more on debt financing than small firms. Hence, these 
arguments are in line with the predictions of both trade-off theory and agency costs theory, which 
both suggest a positive relation between size and gearing.  
On the other hand, pecking order theory claims an inverse relation between leverage and size. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) argued that larger firms are more likely to expose asymmetric 
information to outside investors rather than smaller firms. In addition, capital markets become 
stricter on large firms, which are then enabled by the markets to issue informational sensitive 
equity and thus employ less debt. Moreover, mature firms tend to have higher profits that can be 
used to grow the firm’s size (Frank and Goyal, 2009).  According to Smith (1977) firm’s size is 
strongly related to the issuing costs of external finance. He argued that small firms tend to borrow 
for a short-time period instead of employing long-term debt since fixed interest costs are lower. 
In other words, there is an increased possibility for large companies not to be greatly financed by 
debt.  
3.4 Tangibility 
As argued by the literature, the nature of assets, tangible or intangible, is an essential tool in 
determining a firm’s financing decisions. Frank and Goyal (2009) contended that outsiders could 
easily determine the true value of intangible assets such as goodwill, and therefore an increase in 
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the financial distress risk would be expected. Additionally, Rajan and Zingales (1995) claimed 
that financial distress or bankruptcy costs could be tackled by tangible assets, since these assets 
have higher liquidation value. They also pointed out that tangible fixed assets are essential for 
firms since they are regarded as collateral. Consequently, debt issuers are less worried on giving 
out long-term debt to firms with large fixed tangible assets. Scott (1977) proposed that firms are 
required to issue equity or borrow with higher interest, if they could not offer collaterals. 
Nonetheless, tangibility not only decreases debt risk but also alleviates debt-related agency 
problems. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost theory proposes that highly 
levered firms could sub-optimally invest in order to transfer the wealth from debt holders to 
shareholders. Hence, lenders may demand for collaterals, which offer security to the lender in the 
case where the borrower fails to pay back the debt, in order to relief from agency costs 
(Deesomsak et al., 2004). Hence, both trade-off theory and agency cost theory encourage a 
positive relation between tangibility and leverage. 
On the other hand, pecking order theory predicts a negative correlation between tangibility and 
gearing. According to Harris and Raviv (1991) assets’ tangibility creates less adverse selection 
difficulties, since lower asymmetric information are attached. Consequently, firms with high 
levels of tangible assets are more likely to choose equity over debt financing (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
In practice, the majority of empirical researchers predicted a positive relation of tangibility on 
leverage. Rajan and Zingales’s (1995) study on G-7 countries supported this argument. 
Numerous academics gave a more detailed view on this relation by stating that tangibility is 
positively related to long-term leverage, but negatively related on short-term leverage (Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2002; Hall et al. 2004; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Conversely, Bennett and Donnelly 
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(1993) concluded that tangibility is negatively related to long-term leverage, but positively 
correlated to short-term debt. Furthermore, Berger et al. (1997) also empirically examined the 
relation between tangibility and firm leverage and concluded that tangibility is positively related 
to debt ratios under the cross-sectional analysis, but inversely related under the fixed effects 
model. 
3.5 Growth  
Growth opportunities are considered to be essential in determining a firm’s leverage. Trade-off 
theory predicts a negative relation between growth opportunities and leverage, which suggests 
that constantly growing firms will face a greater risk of financial distress and higher bankruptcy 
costs, as well (Myers, 1984; Antoniou et al., 2008; Harris and Raviv, 1990). According to Titman 
and Wessels (1988) constantly growing firms are mainly composed by a large number of 
intangible assets, which are considered as unsecured assets because they are not likely to be used 
as collateral for creditors. Therefore, the firms’ ability in employing debt is reduced, especially in 
the event of bankruptcy, where the value of intangible assets is diminished.        
Similar to trade-off’s prediction; agency theory also predicts a negative relation between growth 
and leverage. Jensen and Meckling (1976) claimed that managers of levered firms seek to invest 
sub-optimally in order to transfer wealth from debt holders to shareholders (Titman and Wessels, 
1988). It is suggested that firms with substantial growth opportunities face greater danger for 
conflicts between shareholders and debt holders due to investing flexibility (Shah and Khan, 
2007). As a result, in the case of rapidly growing firms, a substantial increase in the cost of debt 
is expected, since creditors would undoubtedly demand a higher premium. Hence, this type of 
firms is likely to rely on internally generated funds or equity rather than debt. Jensen’s (1986) 
free cash flow theory also supports agency’s theory prediction. In addition, he supported that 
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growing firms are not suitable for the application of the debt’s disciplining effect method to 
control for the agency problem. Nonetheless, it is argued that the conflicts between shareholders 
and debt holders can be effectively controlled using short-term debt rather than long-term debt 
(Myers, 1977). Therefore, a negative relation is only expected to occur between long-term debt 
and growth. Hence, it seems to be essential to classify debt into different periods as to capture the 
relationship between determinants and leverage (Smith and Warner, 1979).  
Pecking order theory supports a positive relation between the effects of growth opportunities on 
leverage. This is because fast growing firms are expected to have higher leverage due to the 
financing hierarchy (Frank and Goyal, 2003). In other words, since highly growing firms are 
vulnerable to insufficient returns from investments, then according to financing hierarchy internal 
funds will be used first. However, internally generated funds are quite often not sufficient for 
these firms, thus debt is preferred to equity due to less information asymmetry and lower 
transaction costs. Therefore, higher debt ratio is expected for fast growing firms (Song, 2005).  In 
line with the pecking order theory prediction, Fama and French (2002) also claim that highly 
growth firms may employ debt to finance prospective projects.  
A combination of empirical evidences exists on the effect of growth opportunities on leverage. 
However, the most common prediction is the one of a negative relation (Ozkan, 2001; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Lang et al., 1996; Chen et al., 1997).  Michaelas et al. 
(1999) exercised the effect of growth opportunities on different debt ratios and determine a 
positive relation in all cases. Hall et al. (2004) used growth in sales as a proxy and discovered 
that it is only significantly related to European firms’ short-term debt. Moreover, Wald (1999) 
found a positive relation for four developed countries (UK, France, Germany and Japan) but an 
inverse relation for the US. 
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3.6 Liquidity 
Quite often, liquidity’s measures (common measure is the current ratio) are regarded as a tool in 
analysing a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations.  Nevertheless, according to Ozkan 
(2001) there is a gap in the literature as to the effects of liquidity on a firm’s financing decision.   
On the one hand, a group of scholars believes that a positive relation exists between liquidity and 
leverage. The rationale behind this thought is that firms with more current assets than current 
liabilities (i.e. higher liquidity) can support higher debt ratios due to their ability of meeting their 
short-term borrowing liabilities. Hence, a positive correlation is expected on the ground of trade-
off theory.   
On the other hand, it is argued that firms with higher liquidity are likely to use their assets to fund 
their prospective projects and thus rely less on borrowing (Ozkan, 2001).  In this case, an inverse 
relation between liquidity and leverage is expected, which is supported by the conceptual 
framework of pecking order theory. The inverse relation between liquidity and leverage is also 
supported on the basis of the agency cost theory. Firms’ financial managers can manipulate a 
firm’s assets liquidation, which in a way will benefit stockholders at the expense of debt holders, 
(Deesomsak, 2004). 
3.7 Industry classification 
De Angelo and Masulis (1980) underlined the importance of industry effects on firms’ financing 
decision. Their study suggests that different industries have different optimal structure 
proportions due to altered tax applications across industries. The above argument is also 
supported by a variety of academics (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Scott, 1972; Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Kale and Walking, 1996; Bradley et al., 1984). Schwarz and Aronson (1967) similarly 
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claim that firms operating in the same industry tend to employ similar debt level, whereas 
different debt level applies for firms in other industries. The importance of industry effect can be 
explained according to Hall et al. (2004) and Hovakimian et al. (2001), who support that firms’ 
managers follow a specific structure strategy that signifies the average industry leverage as a 
target. In contrast, it is argued that in the case of profitable firms there is no need for adjustments 
towards the industry’s average leverage ratio (Myers, 1984). Each industry is able to reproduce 
common aspects, such as the asset nature, the riskiness of products or the type of competitors 
and/or credit suppliers that influence firms’ capital structure. Thus, depending on which industry 
firms are operating, they might have lower debt ratios than other firms on different industries 
(Titman, 1984). For instance, firms that manufacture goods, where the availability of a certain 
facility is complex, are very likely to have higher bankruptcy costs (Titman, 1984).  On the other 
hand, government controlled industries such as utilities are likely to have more constant profits 
and less financial distress risk, which give them the chance to sustain higher debt ratio. Hence, in 
line with trade-off theory, different kinds of industries should be chosen to finance their projects 
with more or fewer borrowings, depending on their nature.   
Numerous empirical researchers have attended to test the inter-industry effects on leverage ratio. 
Bradley et al. (1984) show evidences that support a constantly low gearing ratio across Drugs, 
Instruments, Electronics and Food Industries, a steadily increasing gearing ratio across Paper, 
Textile, Steel, Cement and Airline industries and a very high gearing ratio across Gas, Telephone 
and Electricity industries (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Kester, 1986). It is widely accepted that 
gearing should be high across industries with less risk and more tangible assets (Airline), 
industries with slow growth opportunities (Metal and Paper) , while industries with high growth 
 41 
opportunities (Drugs and Electronics), higher risk and more intangible assets (Pharmaceutical) 
should have lower gearing ratio (Titman and Wessels, 1988).  
Table 2 Summary of theories’ predicted signs on determinants 
Variables Trade-off Theory Pecking order theory Agency Cost Theory 
Non-Debt Tax Shields - N/A N/A 
Profitability + - + 
Size + - + 
Tangibility + - + 
Growth - + - 
Liquidity + - - 
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4. Data and Methodology 
 The previous chapter extensively reviewed the selected theoretical determinants of capital 
structure and earlier literature. In this chapter, the proxies chosen to represent the dependent and 
independent variables are introduced and the selected sample and methodology used for this 
study are analysed. 
4.1 Variables type  
As already seen during the analysis done in the previous chapter, different empirical researchers 
have examined the significance of several explanatory variables using various methodologies. In 
line with other empirical researches, this study employs total leverage, long-term leverage and 
short-debt leverage as the three dependent variables. It is argued that corporations are likely to 
adopt different financing strategies with regard to both short-term and long-term debt, thus the 
use of debt ratios is vitally important in order to identify any possible dissimilarities (Bennet and 
Donnely, 1993). Furthermore, non-debt tax shields, profitability, size, tangibility, growth, 
liquidity and industry classification are thoroughly examined as the explanatory variables. The 
choice of the explanatory variables was carefully made in order to incorporate the characteristics 
predicted by the capital structure theories, which have been discussed in Chapter 2.  
4.1.1 Dependent Variables  
The literature on capital structure does not identify a unique proxy for measuring leverage. 
Commonly, two are the most controversial issues related to the leverage’s measurement, among 
academics. The first aspect is related to the argument between the use of book value or market 
value in calculating the leverage, while the second aspect is related to the nature of debt.  
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Without any doubt, leverage serves as the most suitable dependent variable to explore the 
determinants that impact firms’ financing decisions. Nonetheless, a variety of proxies have been 
utilised by the literature in order to measure firms’ leverage. More precisely, academics debate on 
to whether the use of market value is more appropriate than the use of book value. It is argued 
that estimated results may vary depending on to which value (book or market) has been used as a 
proxy for leverage (Ross et al. 2008; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Numerous researchers supported 
that the use of market value is a more appropriate measure for leverage since market value not 
only reflect on firms’ asset values, but it also count for intangible assets and growth opportunities 
(Myers, 1984).  In addition, according to Frank and Goyal (2009) market value offers a better 
view of the market’s future state, while book value is considered to be more historical (Myers, 
1984).    
On the other hand, vast majority of the literature has securely authorised the use of book value as 
proxy for leverage. Bowman (1980) founded that book value and market value are strongly 
correlated. In addition, Titman and Wessels (1988) support that there are not enough differences 
between the use of book values and market values when considering the effects of determinants 
on capital structure. In fact, Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey on US firms confirmed that 
when managers’ financing decision is taken, the use of book value is more reliable than market 
values. Consistently, a recent survey taken on UK listed firms uncovered that about 83% of 
managers use book value to compute debt ratios (Beattie et al., 2006). Hence, alongside with data 
limitations and time considerations this study measures the leverage in terms of book value rather 
than market value.   
Debt’s nature is widely discussed among researchers. Rajan and Zingales (1995) indicated that 
the widest measure of leverage is the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. However, it is 
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argued that this ratio is not stable enough, especially during times of market downturns (Wald, 
1999). Therefore, since this study considers a period that includes the impact of financial crisis in 
2008, it is fairly reasonable to take into consideration other measures of leverage. In addition, 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) stated that researchers relying solely on the total liabilities measure 
could potentially neglect any dissimilarity between long-term debt and short-term debt, since 
they demand different financing decisions (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993).  More precisely, it is 
argued that employing short-term debt can potentially diminish the underinvestment issues, since 
short-term debt matures earlier than growth opportunities’ exercitation (Myers, 1977). In 
addition, small firms could potentially shrink any conflicts between shareholders and debt 
holders by utilising short-term debt (Barnea, 1985). According to Chen (2004) a significant 
amount of firms in China uses short-term debt to finance their needs, since it usually has lower 
cost and is more easily accessible than long-term debt. Hence, it is sensible to separate between 
discrete types of debt on the basis of maturity. In contrast to short-term debt, which refers to debt 
obligations of less than a year, long-term debt is regarded as any financial obligation lasting over 
one year and requires a firm in debt to pay back its borrowings alongside with interest, at 
maturity. For the purposes of this dissertation, the following 3 different dependent variables have 
been used as proxies for gearing:  
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Table 3 Proxies used for the dependent variables 
 
4.1.2 Independent Variables  
The previous section considered the dependent variables. In this section, the proxies used to 
represent the independent variables are presented. In summary, non-debt tax shields, profitability, 
size, tangibility, growth, liquidity and industry classification have been used to explore the 
predictions of trade-off, pecking order and agency costs theories.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Measurement 
Total Leverage 
(tole) 
 
Book Value of Total Debt/Total Assets 
Long-term Leverage 
(lole) 
 
Book Value of Long-Term Debt/ Total Assets 
Short-term Leverage 
(sole) 
 
Book Value of Short-term Debt/Total Assets 
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Table 4 Proxies used for the independent variables 
Independent Variables Measurement 
 
Non-Debt Tax Shields 
(nbts) 
 
Annual Depreciation/Total Assets 
 
Profitability 
(prof) 
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT)/Total 
Assets 
 
Size 
(size) 
 
The Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
 
Tangibility 
(tang) 
 
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 
 
Growth 
(gr) 
Percentage change of total assets 
                             
               
 
 
Liquidity 
(liq) 
 
Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
 
 
Industry Classification 
 
A dummy variable equals to one is included for firms 
within a specific industry and zero otherwise (9 
industries in total, 8 industry dummy variables 
introduced) 
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4.2 Data Collection   
The data for the purposes of this dissertation was collected from DATASTREAM database, 
which offers an extensive range of historical accounting information of annual reports on any 
stock exchange. More precisely, the chosen sample targets all listed firms on FTSE 350 
constituents list, which is quoted on the London Stock Exchange, over a period of 10 years that is 
from 2004-2013.  It is argued that quoted corporations essentially influence a country’s economy, 
thus it is believed that the chosen sample of quoted firms on the London Stock Exchange is 
appropriate in determining aggregate leverage in the UK (Chen, 2004). Nonetheless, not every 
single company was suitable for the purposes of this dissertation. The data sampling technique is 
adopted that scopes to improve the sample’s consistency. Therefore, the final sample set was 
based on the following criteria. Initially, companies that belong to the financial industry, such as 
bank, insurance companies and real estates, were excluded from the final data set because these 
firms require an alternative accounting method and are obeyed to different financial reporting 
regulation, which is very complex (Shan and Khan, 2007). Moreover, specific industrial 
characteristics are attached to such firms. Ozkan (2001) and Bennett and Donnelly (1993) 
followed the same line on their studies. Secondly, companies with no data available throughout 
the whole 10-year sample period were also excluded. Lastly, firms whose data is available for at 
least three consecutive years for every one of the chosen variables during the period 2004-2013 
were kept, in order to increase final set’s size (Ozkan, 2001).  
Consequently from the above criteria, the final set contains data from 191 non-financial firms 
across 9 industries quoted on the FTSE 350 over the 10-year period. The industry breakdown was 
done accordingly to the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) DS Level 2, which is available 
by Thomson Reuters, and the results are presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5 Sample’s breakdown according to industry (APPENDIX 3&4) 
Industry Number of firms in industry Fraction (%)  
Industrials 64 33.3 
Consumer Services 44 23.4 
Consumer Goods 23 12 
Basic Material 16 8.3 
Oil & Gas 12 6.3 
Health Care 10 5.2 
Technology 9 4.7 
Utilities 7 3.6 
Telecommunications 6 3.2 
Total 191 100 
 
4.3 Research Methodology  
This section focuses on the statistical models used to address the research’s purposes. Since the 
chosen determinants differ in their type, then it would be reasonable to apply different models on 
them.  In order to check for any industry effects on the selected dependent variables, the one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) is employed, while panel regression analysis is used to test the 
rest of the determinants. The analysis is contacted through the statistical software, STATA. 
4.3.1 One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
As already discussed (Section 3.7 Industry Classification), it is argued that different industries 
have different optimal capital structures due to different factors. Ozkan (2001) explained that 
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although these factors, such as entry barriers and market conditions, are not observable, they are 
persistent throughout a period and can clarify the variations between industries. This thesis 
includes firms across 9 different industries, thus as the scope of this study suggests it is necessary 
to check for any industry effects on firms’ leverage. Bennett and Donnelly (1993) recommended 
that a regression of the industry dummy variables on leverage is fundamental in order to check 
for specific industry effects. Using a similar model, their study concluded that the coefficients are 
significant, so indeed industry classification affects leverage.  
Hence, in terms of testing the industry effects on the UK capital structure, the one-way analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) is adopted. According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), ANOVA models are 
regression models than only use dummy or qualitative variables as the independent variables. 
ANOVA models aim to check the equality of means between two or more groups and involve 
variance to justify any conclusions made on group means. Thus, in order for ANOVA to come 
into a conclusion, the model checks whether the actual variances between the groups differ from 
the expected variances within the groups.    
The following equations are used to test the relation between industry classification and firm’s 
gearing:  
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Where TOLE represents Total Leverage 
 LOLE represents Long-term Leverage 
 SOLE represents Short-term Leverage 
 α         represents the constant coefficient of intercept  
                       represents the constant coefficient of the explanatory variables 
                       represents the industry dummy variables 
                        represents the error term 
    
Under the null hypothesis, leverage’s mean value (μ) is the same for all 9 industries. If at least 
one industry has a different mean value for leverage then the alternative hypothesis is accepted. 
That is: 
                              
               
 4.3.2 Panel Data Analysis  
The majority of empirical studies on capital structure employed cross-sectional regression and 
panel data regression analyses. Earlier studies tented to test the effect of determinants on leverage 
using a cross-sectional OLS regression model. Nonetheless, the simplicity of this model 
alongside with its main shortcoming of endogeneity, where a correlation exists between the 
explanatory variables and the error term, has motivated the recent empirical literature to use a 
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more stable model that is the panel data analysis. Panel data analysis is superior to the cross-
sectional analysis not only because it deals with the endogeneity problem, but it also offers 
another set of advantages.  
Firstly, panel analysis deals with two-dimensional panel data, where cross-sectional and time 
series are tested together (Hill et al., 2008). Therefore the number of observations is increased, 
which consequently leads to a more consisted estimation model than cross-sectional model do. 
Secondly, due to its high data capacity, panel data keeps collinearity between the independent 
variables at a low level and helps to improve the degree of freedom (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
Moreover, a crucial benefit of using panel data is that the existence of unobserved individual 
effects (heterogeneity) can be seized in the model, and thus the arisen bias from the cross-
sectional model is collapsed (Hill et al., 2008). Finally, according to Hsian (2003) panel data 
model permits the adoption of a specific variable, for instance firm-specific or time-specific 
effect, which helps to prevent any bias arisen from the omitted variable.  
In contrast, the panel’s data execution is indeed very complicated. Problems, associated with 
gathering and planning the data, are attached. Further issues related to the selection and the 
error’s computation are also involved (Baltagi, 2001). Nevertheless, panel data analysis is still 
considered the most suitable method for analyzing both cross-sectional and time series. (Ozkan, 
2001; Booth et al., 2001; Chen, 2004; Bevan and Danbolt, 2004)  
Hence, in order to accomplish the aim of this dissertation the multiple regression models are 
assembled as follows:  
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Where i denotes the i
th 
individual firms from 1 to 192  
            t denotes the t
th  
time period from 2004 to 2013 
            εit  represents the random error term for firm i at time t  
            The independent variables are illustrated in Table 4  
 
Under the null hypothesis all the slope coefficients of independent variables are identical and 
equal to zero. In other words, none of the used independent variables could justify for the capital 
structure decisions of listed firms in UK. The alternative hypothesis proposes that at least one of 
the slope coefficients of independent is not equal to zero, which means that at least one of the 
selected determinants could justify for the capital structure decisions of listed firm in UK.  In the 
case where any of the slope coefficients found to be significant, a positive or a negative value is 
assign to it, which explains the relationship between the respected dependent variable of leverage 
and the relevant determinant.   
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5. Empirical Results, Analysis and Discussion 
This section presents an analytical review of the results obtained from running a series of 
statistical tests that are designed to reach this dissertation’s objectives. In addition, the next part 
offers a brief summary statistics for the chosen dependent and independent variables.   
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6 presents the summary statistics of the chosen dependent variables (tole, lole and sole) and 
the selected explanatory variables (ndts, prof, size, tang, liq and gr). Please refer to Tables 3 & 4 
for a brief explanation of these notations. 
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables (APPENDIX 5.1) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
tole 1861 .2313001 .176383 0 1.844689 
lole 1861 .1928107 .1659729 0 1.133841 
sole 1861 .0384895 .0564867 0 .8591552 
ndts 1861 .0318295 .0257357 0 .2264251 
prof 1861 .1101625 .0997076 -.8006767 1.527951 
size 1861 14.34815 1.635929 9.38236 19.41416 
tang 1861 .5810906 .2181566 0 .9712042 
liq 1861 1.716693 2.621331 .227599 57.14477 
gr 1660 .0691643 .2229692 -5.453322 .9820399 
 
Table 6 points out that the mean levels of total leverage (tole), long-term leverage (lole) and 
short-term leverage (sole) are approximately 23.13%, 19.28% and 3.85%, respectively. Thus, it 
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can be easily seen that long-term debt component explains a huge proportion of the total debt for 
listed firms in the UK. This result is in line with the prediction of Bennett and Donnelly’s (1993) 
research, which claimed that capital structure decisions for firms in the UK are mostly reflected 
on the long-term debt element. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider that short-term debt is a 
more expensive way to finance a firm in the UK in comparison to long-term debt. In addition, not 
surprisingly the above result of total-leverage (23.13%) is almost in accordance to the UK’s total 
leverage (18%) found by the study of Rajan and Zingales (1995) on the G-7 countries. Although 
the predicted total leverage of this study is slightly increased, however it still suggests that in 
general firms in the UK have a quite low level of gearing compare to other countries.  
Moreover, Figure 4 below illustrates the average values of total leverage, long-term leverage and 
short-term leverage across the chosen sample period. The figure confirms the above where long-
term leverage is found to account for the majority proportion of the total debt. Furthermore, 
although the gearing level of UK listed firms appears to hang about 23% over time, there is a 
notable decrease trend across all types of leverage in the recent years, which is probably due to 
the recent financial crisis that evidentially shocked the UK at the end of 2008. In fact, the UK’s 
largest debt controller, which is the financial sector, is still vulnerable to the latest economic 
downturn. More precisely, UK banks decreased the amount of loans given out to investors and 
replaced any short-term debt subsidy to long-term debt and raise capital, in an attempt to recover 
their capital ratios. 
In terms of the explanatory variables, it is worth noting that size (size) and liquidity (liq) are the 
most volatile independent variables with standard deviations of 1.635929 and 2.621331, 
respectively. This result is fairly sensible since both variables own the widest range of values. 
More precisely, size and liquidity’s minimum values are 9.38236 and 0.227599, while their 
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maximum values are 19.41416 and 57.14477, respectively. Liquidity’s result signifies that firms 
in the UK have on average 1.71 times more current assets than current liabilities. Size’s result 
implies that firms neglect to operate on the medium level, but they tend to be large or small. 
Since this study covers a period where financial crisis impacted on it, this outcome is reasonably 
logical. With respect to tangibility, the average fixed assets proportion to total assets is 58% 
having a relatively small variation of 0.2181566. Therefore, it seems that asset structure policy in 
the UK does not vary a lot, which may well entail to a more stable level of non-debt tax shields, 
as they are calculated by depreciation over total assets. In fact, the mean value of non-debt tax 
shields is 3.18%, which is slightly lower than the findings (3.6%) reported in Ozkan’s (2001) 
study. In terms of the growth opportunities, the mean value of 0.069 indicates that on average the 
selected firms in the sample did not have many growth opportunities. Last but not least, 
profitability’s mean value is 11.01%, which shows that firms in the sample are generally 
profitable.  
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Figure 4 Average values of the different leverage measures across the sample period 
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5.2 Regression Identification  
Before moving to the final regression analysis, a series of statistical tests has to be done in order 
to check the reliability of the chosen sample set. Multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity are the 
two main issues that are tested in this study.     
5.2.1 Multicollinearity  
The issue of multicollinearity takes place when there are strong correlations among two or more 
explanatory variables. This problem may lead to the following consequences: Firstly, 
multicollinearity increases the standard errors of the coefficients (β), thus as a result some of the 
explanatory variables may found to be statistically insignificant although in reality they might be 
significant. In addition, some predicted signs of the coefficients might be inaccurate. Secondly, it 
escorts to an artificially high R-squared. Thirdly, the ranges of confidence intervals expand to a 
point where the acceptance of the null hypothesis seems to be the correct decision although this 
might not be the case (Hill et al., 2008). Lastly, using ordinary least squares becomes very 
uncertain since the estimators have large variance. 
This study adopts two different ways to detect for multicollinearity. One way to check is using 
the correlation matrix among the independent variables. Several empirical researchers claimed 
that if the correlation coefficient between two explanatory variables is at least 0.75, regardless of 
its sign, then the existence of multicollinearity is real. The other way used in this study to check 
for multicollinearity is the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which measures how much an 
independent variable is contributing to the standard error in the regression. It is argued that if any 
of the VIF’s results is more than 5, then the corresponding variable exhibits multicollinearity. 
The results from both tests are shown in Tables 7 & 8.  
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Table 7 Correlation Matrix (APPENDIX 5.2) 
 
Clearly, Table 7 does not indicate a major multicollinearity problem among the explanatory 
variables. In fact, the correlation coefficients between the independent variables are even lower 
than 0.5, which strongly suggest that multicollinearity is neglectable. However, it is worth noting 
that the correlation coefficient between long-term leverage and total leverage is significantly high 
(0.9517), which actually confirms the findings in the previous section (5.1 Descriptive Statistics). 
Moreover, non-debt tax shields (ndts), size and tangibility (tang) are positively correlated to the 
different patterns of leverage, while profitability (prof), liquidity (liq) and growth (gr) are 
negatively related. These unqualified results offer a preliminary idea in what to expect in terms of 
the relation between the different patterns of leverage and the selected theoretical determinants.   
 
 tole lole sole ndts prof size tang gr liq 
tole 1.0000         
lole 0.9517
 
1.0000        
sole 0.2815 -0.0268 1.0000       
ndts 0.1871 0.1831 0.0369 1.0000      
prof -0.0962 -0.1052 0.0153 0.0623 1.0000     
size 0.2455 0.2263 0.0922 -0.0617 -0.1642 1.0000    
tang 0.4966 0.5022 0.0475 0.2584 -0.1354 0.3739 1.0000   
gr -0.1276 -0.1392 0.0198 -0.0896 0.1152 -0.0503 -0.0581 1.0000  
liq -0.2178 -0.1760 -0.1591 -0.1357 -0.0287 -0.1279 -0.2242 0.0793 1.0000 
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Table 8 Variance Inflation Factor (APPENDIX 5.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The VIF test for multicollinearity was run three times across the different leverage ratios. 
However, the results in all three times were identical, thus a general table is presented above. The 
VIF’s results also suggest that multicollinearity is not present, since none of the explanatory 
variables has a coefficient value higher than 5. In fact, the average VIF value is 1.14, which is 
really low.  
5.2.2 Heteroskedasticity 
In econometrics, ordinary least squares (OLS) model assumes that the variance of the error term 
is constant, thus homoscedastic. In contrast, when the error terms do not have constant variances, 
then they are said to be heteroscedastic. Although OLS does not require the homoskedasticity 
assumption to prove its unbiasedness, however this assumption is vitally important for OLS to 
confirm its efficiency. Consequently, in the present of heteroskedasticity the OLS model does not 
consider to be BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) anymore, thus its predicted estimators, t-
statistic and p-values might not be reliable (Hill et al., 2008). 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
tang 1.33 0.752230 
size 1.22 0.818837 
ndts 1.13 0.884276 
liq 1.07 0.931695 
prof 1.06 0.943547 
gr 1.03 0.971595 
Mean VIF 1.14  
 59 
This study adopts the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisburg test to check for heteroskedasticity. Apart 
from determining the presence of heteroskadisticity, this test could also provide some insights on 
to whether the use of random effects model is more appropriate or not. However, this will be 
done in later stage by using an extended form of the Breusch-Pagan test. The assumption of 
heteroskedasticity takes the following linear form of explanatory variables:  
  
                                                        
Then, the Breusch-Pagan hypothesis, where the null hypothesis assumes that the model is 
homoscedastic and the alternative hypothesis assumes the model is heteroskedastic, is developed 
as follows:  
                       
               
  
Table 9 presents the results from running the test. It is obvious, as the p-values indicate, that there 
are strong enough evidences to support the rejection of the null hypothesis, thus homoskedasticity 
is not the case in this dissertation. The results imply that the use of OLS will not be a high-quality 
estimation approach in determining the connection between the different patterns of leverage and 
its theoretical determinants in this research. 
Table 9 Results from the Breusch-Pagan test for Heteroskedasticity (APPENDIX 5.4) 
 Total Leverage Long-Term Leverage Short-term Leverage 
Chi2(1) 40.86 58.46 5.73 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.0166 
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5.3 Identification of the appropriate Panel Data Model 
In econometrics, three regression models are the most widely adopted to check for panel data, 
namely random effects (RE) model, fixed effects (FE) model and Pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) model. This section presents the statistical tests used in determining the most suitable 
model. More precisely, the F-test is adopted to identify the most appropriate model between the 
pooled OLS and FE model. Then, the study runs the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test to 
choose the most suitable model between the pooled OLS and RE model. Lastly, the Hausman test 
is employed to check whether FE model is more suitable than the RE model in regressing the 
final sample.    
5.3.1 F-test: Pooled OLS model versus Fixed Effects model 
On the one hand, Pooled OLS model assumes that unobserved heterogeneity or individual effects 
does not exist. On the other hand, FE model assumes that heterogeneity exists and is correlated 
with independent variables.  The results from F-test are designed to assist in the identification of 
the most suitable model. The following hypothesis is build up based on the F-test: 
                              
                                   
 
Table 10 F-test Results (APPENDIX 5.5 where F-test is carried out automatically and presented in 
the last line) 
 Total Leverage Long-Term Leverage Short-term Leverage 
F(190, 1463) 25.95 23.82 4.8 
Prob > F (p-values) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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From the above results, it is clearly noticeable that the null hypothesis is rejected at 1% 
significant level across all different patterns of leverage. Therefore, the Fixed Effect model is 
more suitable for this study.  
5.3.2 Breusch-Pagan LM test: Pooled OLS model versus Random Effects model 
Quite similar to the above distinction between Pooled OLS and FE model, the Random Effects 
model also assumes the existence of heterogeneity. However, the only difference between the 
two models (RE and FE) is that the Random Effects model assumes that heterogeneity is not 
correlated with the explanatory variables. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test rests on 
the following hypothesis:  
                              
                                   
Table 11 Breusch-Pagan LM test Results (APPENDIX 5.6) 
 Total Leverage Long-Term Leverage Short-term Leverage 
Chibar2(01) 3173.75 3088.16 501.62 
Prob > chibar2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
The results indicate that there are enough evidences to support that the null hypothesis should be 
rejected, at 1% significant level, across all types of leverage, which leads to the conclusion that 
Random Effects model is more suitable than Pooled OLS model.   
5.3.3 Hausman Test: Random Effects model versus Fixed Effects model 
The previous tests have confirmed that the use of Pooled OLS model is not appropriate for this 
study. However, identification is needed on to which model of the rest two is superior to the 
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other. Hausman test assists in providing this identification by checking whether the individual 
effects are correlated with the explanatory variables or not. Recalling from previous section, that 
this is the main difference between the models and hence unobservable heterogeneity needs to be 
identified in order to avoid any inconsistency on the final results. Hausman test has the following 
hypothesis:  
                                   
                                  
Table 12 Hausman test Results (APPENDIX 5.7) 
 Total Leverage Long-Term Leverage Short-term Leverage 
Chi2(6) 84.36 34.64 45.71 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
The results presented in the above table clearly reject the null hypothesis for all the three types of 
leverage, at 1% significant level; consequently the Random Effects model is not suitable for this 
study. For this reason, the relation between the different patterns of debt and the six selected 
theoretical determinants will be identified via Fixed Effects regression model. This is in line with 
several previous studies such as Booth et al. (2001) and Bevan and Danbolt (2004).    
5.4 ANOVA Results 
As mentioned in the previous chapter the one-way ANOVA is adopted to discover whether the 
industry classification has any effect on firms’ gearing. As already mentioned, the ANOVA 
model works only with qualitative or dummy variables, thus the different industries from the 
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selected sample are treated as dummy variables (Refer to Table 5). The results of the ANOVA 
models are presented in Table 13, below.   
Table 13 Results from ANOVA (APPENDIX 5.8) 
 Total Leverage Long-Term Leverage Short-term Leverage 
F 47.37 46.12 4.65 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
The above table illustrates that all the dependent variables are strongly influenced by the industry 
classification as the outcomes from ANOVA models are all statistically significant at 1% level. 
Therefore, this study concludes that industry classification has major contact on the UK firm’s 
gearing. This finding is in accordance with previous studies that checked for industry effects 
(Brealey et al. 1983; Bennett and Donnelly, 1993). 
Although ANOVA results have confirmed the significance of industry classification on firms’ 
leverage, the model does not specify where these differences occur. Thus, in order to enhance the 
empirical findings, the different patterns of leverage are regressed relying exclusively on 
different industries dummies and the results are presented in Table 14.   Note that Basic Materials 
dummy variable is omitted, thus the industry operates as the base case for the estimated 
coefficients. With the exceptions of Consumer Goods and Health Care industries, the rest of the 
industries are statistically significant upon both total and long-term leverage. The two 
insignificant industries have almost identical total leverage and long-term leverage with the Basic 
Material industry, which potentially explain their insignificance. This can be seen in Table 15 and 
Figure 5, where a numerical and graphical representation of mean leverage ratios across 
industries is given respectively. On the other hand, only Oil & Gas and Technology industries are 
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statistically significant upon short-term leverage. The results of these two industries indicate a 
negative relation with Basic Materials industry, which implies their adoption of lower short-term 
debt levels than Basic Materials. Nonetheless, the relatively low R-squared (1.9%) found for this 
regression signifies that the model has a poor explanatory power. In contrast, the R-squared 
values for total leverage and long-term leverage are 16.99% and 16.61% respectively. As from 
the results, a significantly high proportion of total leverage and long-term leverage can be 
described by knowing the industry that the firm operates. This study’s result of R-squared on 
total leverage is much higher than the 9.2% found by the study of Bennett and Donnelly (1993). 
However, their study uses a much higher sample of non-financial firms which includes non-listed 
firms, as well. Finally, the F-tests of all three models are statistically significant at 1% level, 
which strongly confirms that industry classification affects the firms’ financing decisions.  
In brief, as the results show, the industries can be divided into three categories. Firstly, Oil & Gas 
and Technology industries have lower debt levels. Secondly, Basic Materials, Consumer Goods 
and Health Care industries own medium debt levels. Finally, Consumer Services, Industrials, 
Telecommunications and Utilities industries contain high debt levels. These results are in line 
with the findings of previous studies, which claim that Utilities is a high-levered industry and 
Technology is a low-levered industry (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Bradley et al., 1984). Companies 
that belong to the Utilities Industry are subject to a special regulation system that helps them to 
retrieve more stable cash flows and thus a lower financial distress risk is attached to them. Hence, 
utility firms can support higher debt levels. In contrast, technology corporations are more 
vulnerable due to technology risk and therefore their earnings are fluctuating. Under the trade-off 
theory, such firms are faced with higher financial distress risks, which reduce their ability to 
borrow and diminish any potential gains from tax shields. Furthermore, as already mentioned 
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above firms in the Basic Materials industry are categorized as medium debt ratio level firms. 
However, such firms should use higher level of debts, since they own high ratios of safe and 
tangible assets. Lenders provide debt more easily to firms with high proportions of tangible 
assets, since they are considered to be safer as tangible assets have higher liquidation value. Thus, 
under the trade-off theory, such firms should borrow more in order to gain from the tax 
advantage of debt.   
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Table 14 Regression models of leverage ratios across different industry dummies (APPENDIX 5.9) 
Industry Total Leverage Long-term Leverage Short-term Leverage 
Basic Materials  Variable omitted  
Consumer Goods 
0.008 
(0.46) 
0.003 
(0.21) 
0.004 
(0.74) 
Consumer Services 
0.12
*** 
(8.02) 
0.12
*** 
(8.42) 
0.001
 
(0.22) 
Health Care 
0.007 
(0.32) 
0.004 
(0.23) 
0.002 
(0.30) 
Industrials 
0.027
*
 
(1.84) 
0.035
**
 
(2.55) 
-0.008 
(-1.62) 
Oil & Gas 
-0.062
***
 
(-3.12) 
-0.044
**
 
(-2.39) 
-0.017
**
 
(-2.50) 
Technology 
-0.125
***
 
(-5.81) 
-0.098
***
 
(-4.81) 
-0.027
***
 
(-3.66) 
Telecommunications 
0.065
*** 
(2.61) 
0.069
*** 
(2.94) 
0.004
 
-0.48 
Utilities 
0.240
***
 
(10.24) 
0.235
***
 
(10.64) 
0.005 
(0.57) 
Constant 
0.192
***
 
(14.89) 
0.149
***
 
(12.69) 
0.043
***
 
(9.50) 
R
2 
0.1699 0.1661 0.0197 
No. Of Obs. 1861 1861 1861 
F(8, 1852) 47.37
*** 
46.12
*** 
4.65
*** 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The number in parenthesis represents the t-statistics 
value. The numbers are rounded up to 3 decimal places. 
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Figure 5 Mean values of different leverages across different industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15 Mean values of different patterns of leverage across different industries (APPENDIX 5.10) 
Industry Total Leverage Long-term Leverage Short-term Leverage 
Basic Materials 0.192 0.149 0.043 
Consumer Goods 0.20 0.153 0.047 
Consumer Services 0.313 0.269 0.044 
Health Care 0.199 0.154 0.045 
Industrials 0.219 0.184 0.035 
Oil & Gas 0.13 0.105 0.025 
Technology 0.067 0.052 0.015 
Telecommunications 0.257 0.218 0.039 
Utilities 0.432 0.384 0.048 
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5.5 Analysis and Discussion of the UK’s theoretical capital structure 
determinants 
5.5.1 Analysis of the Fixed Effects regression model results 
Table 16 Fixed Effect model regression results (APPENDIX 5.5) 
Independent Variable Total Leverage Long-term Leverage Short-term Leverage 
Non-Debt Tax Shields 
(ndts) 
-0.620
**
 
(-2.17) 
-0.171 
(-0.60) 
-0.449
*** 
(-2.70) 
Profitability 
(prof) 
-0.151
*** 
(-5.48) 
-0.088
*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.062
*** 
(-3.90) 
Size 
(size) 
-0.001
 
(-0.13) 
0.011
* 
(1.82) 
-0.012
*** 
(-3.34) 
Tangibility 
(tang) 
0.082
** 
(2.51) 
0.128
*** 
(3.96) 
-0.046
** 
(-2.45) 
Growth 
(gr) 
-0.018
*
 
(-1.91) 
-0.031
***
 
(-3.40) 
0.014
**
 
(2.52) 
Liquidity 
(liq) 
-0.002 
(-1.29) 
0.004
** 
(2.51) 
-0.006
*** 
(-6.51) 
Constant 
0.235
*** 
(2.62) 
-0.331 
(-0.37)
 
0.268
*** 
(5.14)
 
R
2 
0.0921 0.1879 0.0007 
No. Of Obs. 1660 1660 1660 
F(6, 1463) 9.85
*** 
11.46
*** 
11.23
*** 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The number in parenthesis represents the t-statistics 
value. The numbers are rounded up to 3 decimal places. 
 
In sections 5.2 and 5.3, a series of different statistical tests have been employed to identify the 
best possible regression model for testing the study’s final sample set. The results clearly indicate 
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the Fixed Effects as the most suitable panel data regression model for this thesis. The results from 
running the FE model are presented in the Table 16 above. 
The findings from the table above evidently show that some of the selected theoretical 
determinants have significant effects on the UK’s quoted firms capital structure decisions. In fact, 
the explanatory variables are all statistically significant upon the short-term leverage. 
Nevertheless, the R-squared value (0.07%) of this model is extremely low, which indicates a very 
poor explanatory power. However, this is not exactly the case for the other two models, although 
their R-squared values are considered to be low, as well. Particularly, in the case of long-term 
leverage the R-squared value is 18.79%, which is almost consistent with the findings (18%) in 
the study of Rajan and Zingales (1995), which uses the book value as a proxy for all variables. 
The low explanatory power may be due to the chosen proxies used to represent the variables or 
the unobserved effects. 
In the following section, the impacts of the six selected theoretical determinants on the different 
patterns leverage are thoroughly discussed.   
5.5.2 Discussion  
5.5.2.1 Non-Debt Tax Shields  
Based on the results obtained from running the three regression models, the coefficients for non-
debt tax shields variable are -0.620, -0.171, -0.449 for total leverage, long-term leverage and 
short-term leverage, respectively. In other words, for every percentage point of increase in non-
debt tax shields is expected to decrease total leverage, long-term leverage and short-term leverage 
by 62, 17.1 and 44.9 percentage points, respectively. Moreover, the coefficients of total leverage 
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and short-term leverage are statistically significant at 5% level and 1% level respectively, while 
the coefficient for long-term leverage is found to be insignificant.  
These results are in line to previous studies on UK firms, which indicated that non-debt tax 
shields importantly affect the firms’ debt structure (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Ozkan, 2001). 
More precisely, the negative prediction is consistent with the research done by De Angelo and 
Masulis (1980) who found that the non-debt tax shields are inversely related to gearing ratio, 
which is in accordance to the trade-off theory. Their study supports that the tax shield advantage 
from borrowing could potentially be substituted by other non-debt tax shields such as 
depreciation expenses, investment tax credits, and R&D expenses. Hence, firms with higher non-
debt tax shields are expected to rely less on the advantage of interest tax shields, therefore issuing 
debt is not essential for such companies. This negative relation also contradicts the view of some 
scholars, who support that a positive relation exists between gearing and non-debt tax shields. 
This view is based on the fact that companies with high non-debt tax shields are capable of 
issuing more debt since such firms are considered to own more tangible assets that could be used 
as collateral to debt issuers (Scott, 1977; Moore, 1986). 
5.5.2.2 Profitability  
 As expected due to its great importance, profitability is found to be strongly significant at 1% 
level in all three levels of debt. The coefficients of profitability are  -0.151, -0.088 and -0.062 for 
total leverage, long-term leverage and short-term leverage respectively. The negative sign of the 
coefficients claims that profitable quoted firms in the UK do not seek for debt, which supports 
the predictions of pecking order theory. Since the theory is based on the information asymmetry 
between managers and outside investors, a company which has locked significant amounts of 
earnings over the years tends to rely less on debt since any issues such as giving up valuable 
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growth opportunities can be resolved using the internally generated funds. Vast majority of the 
literature also supported the findings of this study. More precisely, both studies of Bennett and 
Donnelly (1993) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) whose sample data combined covers the period 
1977-1997, with only exception the year 1989-1990, indicated that profitable firms in the UK 
employ less debt. In contrast, these results are against the findings of Pano (2003) who supported 
that a significant positive relation exists between earnings and leverage for both UK and Italian 
listed firms.  
Moreover, the outcome of this study strongly contradicts the implications of both the trade-off 
theory and the agency cost theory. Trade-off theory predicts that highly profitable firms are 
subject to lower bankruptcy costs and less financial distress risk, thus such companies tend to 
employ more debt due to the attractiveness of interest tax shields. From the agency’s cost theory 
point of view, an increase in the level of debt would potentially decrease the amount of free cash 
flows available for managers to pursue their own interest.  
5.5.2.3 Size  
In this research under the FE model, a 1% increase in company’s size will result in a decrease of 
0.001% in total leverage and 0.012% in short-term leverage. In contrast, long-term leverage 
increases at a rate of 0.011%. Moreover, the coefficient of total leverage is found to be 
insignificant, while the coefficients for long-term leverage and short-term leverage are found to 
be significant at 10% level and 1% level respectively. This alternation on the signs between long-
term leverage and short-term leverage is perhaps the reason for the total’s leverage 
insignificance. Nonetheless, these results are in accordance with Bevan and Danbolt (2002) 
whose study on the UK firms also found that the effect of a firm size depends on the different 
 72 
patterns of leverage. More precisely, they claimed that larger firms tend to rely on long-term debt 
for raising finance while smaller firms have a preference on short-term debt.  
The positive relation between long-term leverage and firm size can be described on the grounds 
of both the trade-off theory and the agency cost theory which both suggest that larger firms are 
inclined to use more long-term debt. From the trade-off theory perspective, this relation can be 
explained on the fact that big firms are likely to be more well diversified and have less  costs of 
financial distress attached than small firms which consequently make such firms less prone to 
bankruptcy (Titman and Wessels, 1988).   On the basis of agency cost theory, larger firms are 
induced to employ more long-term debt in order to efficiently control the managerial behaviour 
which is difficult to be monitored due to a more dilute ownership of such firms. In contrast, 
smaller firms have only a small number of shareholders and thus their desire for long-term debt is 
reduced. In addition, according to Bevan and Danbolt (2004) the choice of long-term debt for 
small firms is restricted by debt holders since there is a huge lending risk attached to these firms. 
It is further explained that small firms tend to rely less on long-term term since any conflicts 
between shareholders and debt holders can be crucially harmful for small corporations 
(Michaelas, 1999).  
On the other hand, the negative relation between short-term leverage and firm size is supported 
by the pecking order theory (Pettit and Singer, 1985). In more details, shareholders of small firms 
are faced with the danger of losing control or even a threat of takeover since share flotation in 
small firms might broaden the ownerships. Consequently, small corporations avoid issuing 
equity, relying first on internally generated funds and then on short-term bank debt because of 
lower transaction if additional finance is needed. 
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Although the coefficient of total leverage is insignificant, however its negative sign indicates that 
larger firms have a preference to employ less debt, on the basis of pecking order theory.  
 5.5.2.4 Tangibility 
According to the Table 16, the predicted coefficients for tangibility differ between the specific 
leverage ratios examined. In more detail, the coefficients found for total leverage, long-term 
leverage and short-term leverage are 0.082, 0.128 and -0.046 respectively. In addition, it is 
clearly indicated that all the coefficients are found to be statistically significant at 1% level which 
implies a very strong relationship. In fact the findings are consistent with a number of previous 
empirical studies, which also supported that tangibility is positively related to total leverage and 
long-term leverage, and negatively related to short-term leverage (Bevan and Danbolt, 2002; Hall 
et al. 2004; Titman and Wessels, 1988).  From the results it can be concluded that quoted firms in 
the UK that have high proportion of fixed assets (i.e. higher tangibility) have a preference to long 
–term debt, while more intangible firms prefer short-term debt.  
 The positive relationship is theoretically supported on the basis of trade-off theory and the 
agency costs theory. It is contented that lenders are hesitant in providing loans due to potential 
threat of asset substitution which transfers value from a firm’s bondholders to its shareholders. 
Thus, debt holders demand from firms to provide collateral as a warranty on their lending, given 
the existing risk from the conflicts between shareholder and debt holders. In addition, it is argued 
that firms with higher proportion of tangible assets that are easy to collateralise can employ more 
debt at a lower cost. In fact, such firms have less financial distress risk since tangible assets have 
higher liquidation value in the case of bankruptcy. 
On the contrary, the outcome from the short-term leverage model predicts a negative relation to 
tangibility. A possible explanation for this negative relationship is given by the fact that firms are 
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trying to match their debt obligations according to their assets. In other words, long-term debt 
finances fixed assets, while current assets are financed by short-term debt.  According to Myers 
(1977) firms that are engaged to such behaviour can reduce the conflicts between shareholders 
and debt holders by certifying that debt obligations are met in accordance with the value of assets 
at time.  
5.5.2.5 Growth  
In this research growth’s coefficients are -0.018, -0.031 and 0.014 for total leverage, long-term 
leverage and short-term leverage respectively. Moreover, they are all found to be statically 
significant at 10%, 1% and 5% levels. This research concludes that fast growing listed firms (i.e. 
firms with high percentage change on their total assets) in the UK tend to rely less on long-term 
debt. In fact if external financing is needed they choose short-term debt. This finding of negative 
relation is supported by a variety of empirical investigations in the past such as Ozkan (2001), 
Rajan and Zignales (1995) or Deesomsak et al. (2004). In addition, the prediction of positive 
relation between short-term debt and growth is in line with Bevan and Danbolt (2002) and 
Michaelas et al. (1999) whose studies referred on the UK companies.   
The inverse relationship is supported by the trade-off theory and the agency cost theory of capital 
structure. According to Myers (1984) firms with higher growth opportunities exhibit higher 
bankruptcy costs. Furthermore, it is argued that fast growing firms own a large amount of 
intangible assets that cannot be used as collateral and thus lenders are reluctant in providing such 
firms with long-term loans (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Moreover, according to Ozkan (2001) 
growth opportunities are meaningless once the firm goes bankrupt. In addition, it is suggested 
that the managers of firms with substantial growth opportunities have more incentives to invest 
suboptimal in order to transfer the wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Consequently, 
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lenders demand higher premium as compensation to a higher danger of asset substitution and 
underinvestment problems. Furthermore, it is argued that the conflicts between shareholders and 
debt holders can be effectively controlled using short-term debt rather than long-term debt 
(Myers, 1977). Thus, the findings are in line with the previous statement. 
The positive relation found between growth and short-term leverage is supported by the pecking 
order theory, which implies that highly growing firms will try to adopt the financing hierarchy. 
However, very often the internally generated funds are not sufficient for such firm and thus will 
then move to the choice of debt, which in this case is the short-term debt.  
5.5.2.6 Liquidity 
 In terms of the liquidity variable the coefficients estimated for the total leverage, long-term 
leverage and short-term leverage models are -0.002, 0.004 and -0.006 respectively. In terms of 
their significance only long-term leverage and short-term leverage are found to be significant at 
5% level and 1% level correspondingly. The result of negative relation between total leverage 
and liquidity is consistent with Ozkan (2001) whose paper reported the same finding using UK 
firm panel data. On the other hand, Pano (2003) evidentially proved that liquidity is 
proportionally correlated to leverage for listed firms in the UK and Italy.  
 Nonetheless, the prediction of lower leverage for firms with higher liquidation is in accordance 
with the pecking order theory and the agency theory of capital structure. It is argued that firms 
with higher current ratio are expected to use their liquid cash to fund any future investments 
which implies that debt financing is less likely to be used. Furthermore, higher liquidity increases 
the danger of conflicts between the shareholders and debt holders as firms’ managers may 
manipulate these liquid assets in order to transfer the wealth to the shareholders at the expense of 
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the debt holders. Therefore, these firms are expected to have a higher cost of debt which forbids 
them from making use of debt financing.  
On the other hand, a group of scholars believe that the positive relation between liquidity and 
long-term debt can be explained by the fact that firms with more liquid assets have a better ability 
on repaying their short-term obligations, thus these firms are expected to use more long-term 
debt. In fact, this view explains the significant findings of this thesis where liquidity is found to 
be positively related to long-term debt and inversely related to short-term debt.  
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6. Conclusion  
This research attempts to investigate the determinants of capital structure and their impact on 
different debt maturity levels using data that targets all the UK listed firms. Furthermore, the 
paper is designed to capture the differences in gearing ratio across different industries in the UK.   
Lastly, the study aims to identify which capital structure theory is the most appropriate to explain 
the financing activities within the UK quoted firms.  
In terms of the capital structure theories, this study follows the majority of the literature, which 
mainly focused on testing the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. In addition, the 
agency cost theory is also considered in this thesis in order to have a better understanding on the 
firms’ financing decision. After applying several criteria, the final set contains a panel data of 
191 non-financial firms across 9 industries quoted in the FTSE 350 on the London Stock 
Exchange over the 10-year period that is 2004-2013. Total leverage, long-term leverage and 
short-term leverage were chosen to serve as the dependent variables of the three different 
regression models and their calculation was based on their book value. Moreover, seven 
theoretical determinants including; non-debt tax shields, profitability, size, tangibility, growth, 
liquidity and industry classification, were selected to examine their relation with the different 
patterns of leverage.  
In order to test the effects of different industries on firms’ financing decisions, the one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was employed. The results clearly indicate that industry 
classification heavily affects the company’s debt levels. This finding is consistent with previous 
empirical studies such as Brealey et al. (1983) or Bennett and Donnelly (1993). More precisely, 
this dissertation points out that Utilities is the industry with the highest leverage ratios, while 
Technology was found to be the least industry in terms of leverage.  These results are in 
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accordance with the predictions of trade-off theory since firms in Utilities industry are subject to 
more stable cash flows and thus a lower risk of financial distress is attached to them, while firms 
in Technology industry are more vulnerable due to technology risk and therefore these firms face 
a higher financial distress risk.  
Since this study deals with panel data, it was necessary to carry out a series of tests in order to 
detect the most suitable regression model that would help to explore the effects of the chosen 
determinants. The results strongly suggest that the use of Fixed Effects model is the most 
preferred approach since it assumes that heterogeneity exists and is correlated with the 
explanatory variables.  
The results from running the FE model suggest that most of the chosen explanatory variables are 
significant on the UK listed firms. In fact, in the case of short-term leverage it appears that all the 
determinants are significant; however this model has a very low explanatory power. As a 
summary, non-debt tax shields variable is significant to total leverage and short-term leverage, 
which implies that tax shields are considered to be very important for listed firms in the UK. In 
addition, the negative sign of non-debt tax shields is in accordance with the trade-off theory. 
Profitability is one of the most significant determinants for listed firms in the UK. Its negative 
sign is supported by the pecking order theory of capital structure which claims that profitable 
firms will rely first on their earnings. The effects of firm size pertain to maturity of debt rather 
than total leverage. Big listed firms in the UK tend to rely more on long-term debt while smaller 
firms favour short-term debt. This may suggest that small firms are more vulnerable during 
recessions. Nonetheless, the negative sign of this determinant is supported by the pecking order 
theory. Tangibility is found to be significant for all the patterns of leverage and its effects are 
consistent with the trade-off theory and agency cost theory. The findings lead to the conclusion 
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that quoted firms with higher proportion of fixed assets in the UK over the period 2004-2013 tend 
to rely more on long-term debt. Growth is another important determinant for listed firms in the 
UK. The results suggest fast growing firms have a preference on short-term debt. This finding is 
accordance with the trade-off theory and the agency cost theory. Finally, liquidity was found to 
be positively significant on long-term leverage and negatively significant on short-term leverage.  
The negative prediction on total leverage is supported by pecking order theory and the agency 
cost theory.   
Finally, the paper does not provide a conclusive indication on to which capital structure theory 
perfectly reflects the financing activities within the UK quoted firms as the results are quite 
mixture. Nevertheless, the trade-off theory seems to explain better the UK listed firms financing 
decisions.  
6.1 Limitations and Suggestions  
This dissertation attempts to enhance the existing literature of the UK capital structure decisions 
by providing a detailed investigation for listed firms on the FTSE 350 constituent list. 
Nonetheless, similar to previous studies this paper also suffers from some shortcomings that need 
to be tackled in future researches.  
Firstly, due to time considerations and lack of data this research uses the book value, which has 
been evidentially proved to lessen the explanatory power of the regression models. Thus, future 
studies could make use of the market value, which improves the models’ fit. Secondly, this paper 
lacks in terms of qualitative analysis. According to Beattie et al (2006) market efficiency is 
barely believed by the most managers, thus in order to capture the managers’ behaviour, an in-
depth survey over time can be conducted that could shed light on firms’ financial decisions.  
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Modigliani and Miller theory (without corporate tax) 
 
 
Proposition I: 
      
Since in a perfect market the Value Additive Principle (VAP) must hold then,  
     ( )  
   
  
 
     (      )    (  )    (   )    (  )    (  )  
   
  
 
Therefore 
      
          
 
 
   
 
 
 
Proposition II: 
      (     )
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost of Capital 
     
 
 
 
    WACC 
 
 
 Debt/Equity Ratio 
Figure 1 Modigliani and Miller theory (without corporate tax) 
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Notation: 
  = Value of a levered firm 
  = Value of an unlevered firm 
  = Cost of capital of an unlevered firm  
  = Cost of capital of a levered firm 
  = Cost of Debt 
  = Cost of Equity  
 = Equity 
 = Debt 
 = D+E 
NCF= Perpetual net cash flow 
i= coupon rate 
B= nominal value of debt 
WAAC= Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
 
2. Modigliani and Miller theory (with corporate tax) 
 
 
Proposition I: 
 
          
Where 
                                
          (    )
 
 
   
 
 
 
Proposition II: 
      (     )
 
 
(    ) 
 
Notation: 
 
  = Corporate tax rate  
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Figure 2 Modigliani and Miller theory (with corporate tax) 
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3. Firms selected for this dissertation 
 
Basic Materials (16) 
Anglo American PLC 
Antofagasta PLC 
BHP Billiton PLC 
Centamin 
Croda International 
Elementis PLC 
Ferrexpo PLC 
Johnson Matthey PLC 
Kazakhmys PLC 
Lonmin PLC 
Mondi PLC 
Randgold Resources 
Rio Tinto PLC 
Synthomer PLC 
Vedanta Resources 
Victrex 
 
Consumer Goods (23) 
A.G. BARR PLC 
Associated British 
Barratt Developments 
Bellway PLC 
Berkeley Group 
Bovis Homes Group 
British American Tob 
Burberry Group 
Cranswick PLC 
Dairy Crest Group 
Diageo PLC 
GKN PLC 
Greencore Group PLC 
Imperial Tobacco Group 
Persimmon PLC 
PZ Cussons PLC 
Reckitt Benckiser 
Redrow PLC 
Sabmiller PLC 
Tate & Lyle PLC 
Taylor Wimpey PLC 
Ted Baker  PLC 
Unilever PLC 
Consumer Services (44) 
Booker Group PLC 
BSKYB Group PLC 
Bwin.Party Digital E. 
Compass Group PLC 
Debenhams PLC 
Dignity 
Domino's Pizza Group 
Dunelm Group PLC 
EasyJet PLC 
Enterprise Inns PLC 
Euromoney Instl Inv 
First Group 
Go-Ahead Group PLC 
Greene King PLC 
Halfords Group PLC 
Home Retail Group 
Inchcape PLC 
Informa  
Intercontinental 
ITV PLC 
J Sainsbury PLC 
JD Sports Fashion 
Kingfisher PLC 
Ladbrokes PLC 
Marks & Spencer  
Marston's PLC 
Millennium  
Mitchells & Butlers  
N Brown Group PLC 
National Express  
Next PLC 
Pearson PLC 
Rank Group PLC 
Restaurant Group PLC 
Sports Direct Inter 
Stagecoach Group PLC 
TESCO PLC 
UBM PLC 
Wetherspoon (JD) 
WH Smith PLC 
Whitbread PLC 
William Hill PLC 
WM Morrison Supermt 
WPP PLC 
 
Health Care (10) 
AstraZeneca PLC 
BTG  
Dechra Pharma 
Genus PLC 
GlaxoSmithKline  
Hikma Pharmaceuticals  
Shire PLC 
Smith & Nephew PLC 
Synergy Health PLC 
UDG Healthcare Public 
 
Industrials (64) 
Aggreko PLC 
Ashtead Group PLC 
Babcock Int’l Group 
BAE Systems  
Balfour Beatty PLC 
BBA Aviation  
Berendsen PLC 
Bodycote  
Bunzl PLC 
Capita PLC 
Carillion PLC 
Cobham PLC 
CRH PLC 
DDC 
De La Rue PLC 
Diploma PLC 
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Domino Printing 
Electrocomponents 
Essentra PLC 
Experian PLC 
Fenner PLC 
Fisher (James) & Sons 
G4S PLC 
Galliford Try PLC 
Halma PLC 
Hays  
Homeserve PLC 
Howden Joinery GP 
IMI PLC 
Interserve 
Intertek Group 
Keller Group PLC 
Kier Group PLC 
Meggitt PLC 
Melrose Industries 
Michael Page Intl 
Mitie Group PLC 
Morgan Advanced 
Northgate PLC 
Oxford Instruments  
PayPoint PLC 
Premier Farnell PLC 
QinetiQ Group  
Regus PLC 
Renishaw PLC 
Rentokil Initial PLC 
Rexam PLC 
Rolls-Royce Holdings 
Rotork PLC 
RPC Group PLC 
RPS Group PLC 
Senior  
Serco Group 
SIG  
Smith (DS) 
Smiths Industries 
Spectris 
Travis Perkins PLC 
Ultra Electronics HDG 
Vesuvius 
Weir Group PLC (THE) 
Wolseley PLC 
WS Atkins PLC 
XAAR 
 
Oil & Gas (12) 
AMEC PLC 
BG Group PLC 
BP PLC 
Cairn Energy PLC 
Hunting PLC 
John Wood Group PLC 
Petrofac 
Premier Oil  
Royal Dutch Shell A’ 
Royal Dutch Shell B’ 
Soco Int’l PLC 
Tullow Oil PLC 
 
Technology (9) 
Aveva Group PLC 
Computacenter PLC 
CSR PLC 
Fidessa Group 
Imagination Technologies 
Laird PLC 
Pace PLC 
Sage Group PLC (THE) 
Spirent Comm 
 
Telecommunications (6) 
BT Group PLC 
Cable & Wireless 
Colt Group 
Inmarsat PLC 
Telecom Plus PLC 
Vodafone Group PLC  
 
Utilities (7) 
Centrica PLC 
Drax Group 
National Grid PLC 
Pennon Group PLC 
Severn Trent PLC 
SSE PLC 
United Utilities PLC 
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4. List of industries and sectors selected 
 
Industry Sectors 
 
Basic Materials Chemicals 
Forestry & Paper 
Industrial Metals & Mining 
Mining 
 
Consumer Goods Automobiles & Parts 
Beverages 
Food Producers 
Household Goods & Home Construction 
Personal Goods 
Tobacco 
 
Consumer Services Food & Drug Retailers 
Gambling 
General Retailers 
Media 
Travel & Leisure 
 
Health Care Health Care Equipment & Services 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
 
Industrials Aerospace & Defense 
Construction & Materials 
Electronic & Electrical Equipment 
Industrial Engineering 
Industrial Transportation 
General Industrials 
Support Services 
 
 
Oil & Gas Oil & Gas Producers 
Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution 
 
 
Technology Software & Computer Services 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 
 
Telecommunications Fixed Line Telecommunications 
Mobile Telecommunications 
 
Utilities Electricity 
Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 
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5. Stata Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4. Test for Heteroscedasticity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          gr        1660    .0691643    .2229692  -5.453322   .9820399
         liq        1861    1.716693    2.621331    .227599   57.14477
        tang        1861    .5810906    .2181566          0   .9712042
        size        1861    14.34815    1.635929    9.38236   19.41416
                                                                      
        prof        1861    .1101625    .0997076  -.8006767   1.527951
        ndts        1861    .0318295    .0257357          0   .2264251
        sole        1861    .0384895    .0564867          0   .8591552
       lole        1861    .1928107    .1659729          0   1.133841
        tole        1861    .2313001     .176383          0   1.844689
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
5.1. Descriptive Statistics: 
 
        liq    -0.2178  -0.1760  -0.1591  -0.1357  -0.0287  -0.1279  -0.2242   0.0793   1.0000
          gr    -0.1276  -0.1392   0.0198  -0.0896   0.1152  -0.0503  -0.0581   1.0000
        tang     0.4966   0.5022   0.0475   0.2584  -0.1354   0.3739   1.0000
       size     0.2455   0.2263   0.0922  -0.0617  -0.1642   1.0000
        prof    -0.0962  -0.1052   0.0153   0.0623   1.0000
        ndts     0.1871   0.1831   0.0369   1.0000
       sole     0.2815  -0.0268   1.0000
        lole     0.9517   1.0000
        tole     1.0000
                                                                                               
                   tole     lole     sole     ndts     prof     size     tang       gr      liq
5.2. Correlation Matrix  
    Mean VIF        1.14
                                    
          gr        1.03    0.971595
        prof        1.06    0.943547
         liq        1.07    0.931695
        ndts        1.13    0.884276
        size        1.22    0.818837
        tang        1.33    0.752230
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  5.3. VIF test multicollinearity 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    40.86
         Variables: fitted values of tole
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Total Leverage 
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Long-term Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
Short-term Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5. F-test: Pooled OLS model versus Fixed Effects Model 
 
Total Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(190, 1463) =    25.95           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .80546014   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07394065
     sigma_u    .15045304
                                                                              
       _cons     .2352418   .0898123     2.62   0.009     .0590673    .4114164
         liq    -.0019274   .0014942    -1.29   0.197    -.0048584    .0010036
          gr    -.0176134   .0092208    -1.91   0.056    -.0357008    .0004741
        tang     .0816261   .0325541     2.51   0.012     .0177684    .1454838
        size     -.000821   .0062306    -0.13   0.895    -.0130428    .0114008
        prof    -.1509861   .0275584    -5.48   0.000    -.2050443   -.0969278
        ndts    -.6195786   .2856984    -2.17   0.030    -1.180001   -.0591564
                                                                              
        tole        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1643                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,1463)          =      9.85
       overall = 0.0921                                        max =         9
       between = 0.1145                                        avg =       8.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0388                         Obs per group: min =         4
Group variable: comp                            Number of groups   =       191
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1660
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    58.46
         Variables: fitted values of lole
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0166
         chi2(1)      =     5.73
         Variables: fitted values of sole
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Long-term Leverage 
 
 
Short-term Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(190, 1463) =    23.82           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .77128638   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07341073
     sigma_u    .13480976
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0330834   .0891686    -0.37   0.711    -.2079953    .1418286
         liq     .0037279   .0014835     2.51   0.012     .0008179    .0066379
          gr    -.0311468   .0091547    -3.40   0.001    -.0491046    -.013189
        tang     .1280726   .0323208     3.96   0.000     .0646725    .1914726
        size     .0112755   .0061859     1.82   0.069    -.0008587    .0234097
        prof    -.0884987   .0273609    -3.23   0.001    -.1421695    -.034828
        ndts    -.1710516   .2836508    -0.60   0.547    -.7274573    .3853541
                                                                              
        lole        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2268                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,1463)          =     11.46
       overall = 0.1879                                        max =         9
       between = 0.2297                                        avg =       8.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0449                         Obs per group: min =         4
Group variable: comp                            Number of groups   =       191
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1660
F test that all u_i=0:     F(190, 1463) =     4.80           Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .52161084   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .04300554
     sigma_u    .04490627
                                                                              
       _cons     .2683255   .0522368     5.14   0.000     .1658584    .3707925
         liq    -.0056553   .0008691    -6.51   0.000      -.00736   -.0039505
          gr     .0135334    .005363     2.52   0.012     .0030133    .0240534
        tang    -.0464466   .0189342    -2.45   0.014    -.0835876   -.0093055
        size    -.0120965   .0036238    -3.34   0.001     -.019205    -.004988
        prof    -.0624873   .0160286    -3.90   0.000    -.0939288   -.0310458
        ndts    -.4485276   .1661686    -2.70   0.007    -.7744817   -.1225735
                                                                              
        sole        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6624                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(6,1463)          =     11.23
       overall = 0.0007                                        max =         9
       between = 0.0199                                        avg =       8.7
R-sq:  within  = 0.0440                         Obs per group: min =         4
Group variable: comp                            Number of groups   =       191
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1660
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5.6. Breusch-Pagan LM test: Pooled OLS model versus Random Effects Model 
 
Total Leverage 
 
 
Long-term Leverage 
 
 
Short-term Leverage 
 
 
 
 
  
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  3173.75
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0149521       .1222787
                       e     .0054672       .0739406
                    tole     .0290184       .1703479
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        tole[comp,t] = Xb + u[comp] + e[comp,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =  3088.16
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0136205        .116707
                       e     .0053891       .0734107
                    lole     .0267376       .1635162
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        lole[comp,t] = Xb + u[comp] + e[comp,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000
                             chibar2(01) =   501.62
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u      .000773       .0278028
                       e     .0018495       .0430055
                    sole     .0027389       .0523346
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        sole[comp,t] = Xb + u[comp] + e[comp,t]
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects
. xttest0
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5.7. Hausman test: Random Effects Model versus Fixed Effects Model 
 
Total Leverage 
 
 
Long-term Leverage 
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       84.36
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         liq     -.0019274    -.0011174         -.00081        .0004174
          gr     -.0176134    -.0160875       -.0015258               .
        tang      .0816261     .1715784       -.0899523        .0173462
        size      -.000821     .0069235       -.0077445        .0043417
        prof     -.1509861    -.1296011       -.0213849        .0030712
        ndts     -.6195786     .0483276       -.6679062        .1721954
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       34.64
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         liq      .0037279     .0037417       -.0000139        .0004565
          gr     -.0311468    -.0304894       -.0006573         .000715
        tang      .1280726     .2091919       -.0811193         .017939
        size      .0112755     .0104525        .0008229        .0044189
        prof     -.0884987    -.0776887         -.01081        .0044399
        ndts     -.1710516     .2044345       -.3754861        .1765735
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed
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Short-term Leverage 
 
 
 
5.8. One-way ANOVA  
 
Total Leverage 
 
 
Long-term Leverage 
 
 
Short-term Leverage 
 
  
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       45.71
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
         liq     -.0056553    -.0041712       -.0014841        .0004942
          gr      .0135334     .0134315        .0001019        .0012945
        tang     -.0464466    -.0157897       -.0306568        .0156944
        size     -.0120965     .0012624       -.0133589        .0033154
        prof     -.0624873    -.0310105       -.0314768        .0063619
        ndts     -.4485276     .0268556       -.4753832        .1433501
                                                                              
                   fixed          .          Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) = 195.2271  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
    Total           57.8663856   1860    .03111096
                                                                        
 Within groups      48.0362228   1852   .025937485
Between groups      9.83016284      8   1.22877035     47.37     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) = 213.1678  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
    Total           51.2374555   1860   .027547019
                                                                        
 Within groups      42.7262009   1852   .023070303
Between groups      8.51125466      8   1.06390683     46.12     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
Bartlett's test for equal variances:  chi2(8) = 250.7050  Prob>chi2 = 0.000
    Total           5.93479731   1860   .003190751
                                                                        
 Within groups      5.81796576   1852    .00314145
Between groups      .116831553      8   .014603944      4.65     0.0000
                                                                        
    Source              SS         df      MS            F     Prob > F
                        Analysis of Variance
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5.9. Regression models of leverage ratios across different industry dummies 
 
Total Leverage 
 
 
Long-term Leverage 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1920311   .0128944    14.89   0.000      .166742    .2173203
_Iindustry_9     .2395319    .023403    10.24   0.000     .1936329    .2854309
_Iindustry_8     .0646214   .0247682     2.61   0.009     .0160449    .1131979
_Iindustry_7    -.1251148   .0215499    -5.81   0.000    -.1673795   -.0828502
_Iindustry_6    -.0615899    .019745    -3.12   0.002    -.1003147   -.0228651
_Iindustry_5      .026508   .0144234     1.84   0.066    -.0017797    .0547958
_Iindustry_4     .0066609   .0208246     0.32   0.749    -.0341812     .047503
_Iindustry_3     .1206243   .0150389     8.02   0.000     .0911294    .1501192
_Iindustry_2     .0077107   .0167793     0.46   0.646    -.0251976     .040619
                                                                              
        tole        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    57.8663856  1860   .03111096           Root MSE      =  .16105
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1663
    Residual    48.0362228  1852  .025937485           R-squared     =  0.1699
       Model    9.83016284     8  1.22877035           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,  1852) =   47.37
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1861
i.industry        _Iindustry_1-9      (_Iindustry_1 for ind~y==Basic Materials  omitted)
. xi:reg tole i.industry 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1494208   .0121609    12.29   0.000     .1255703    .1732712
_Iindustry_9     .2349174   .0220716    10.64   0.000     .1916296    .2782053
_Iindustry_8     .0687536   .0233592     2.94   0.003     .0229406    .1145667
_Iindustry_7     -.097683   .0203239    -4.81   0.000    -.1375432   -.0578227
_Iindustry_6    -.0444204   .0186217    -2.39   0.017    -.0809421   -.0078986
_Iindustry_5     .0346431   .0136028     2.55   0.011     .0079646    .0613216
_Iindustry_4     .0044627   .0196399     0.23   0.820    -.0340559    .0429814
_Iindustry_3     .1194603   .0141833     8.42   0.000     .0916433    .1472773
_Iindustry_2     .0034007   .0158247     0.21   0.830    -.0276354    .0344369
                                                                              
        lole        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    51.2374555  1860  .027547019           Root MSE      =  .15189
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1625
    Residual    42.7262009  1852  .023070303           R-squared     =  0.1661
       Model    8.51125466     8  1.06390683           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,  1852) =   46.12
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1861
i.industry        _Iindustry_1-9      (_Iindustry_1 for ind~y==Basic Materials  omitted)
. xi:reg lole i.industry 
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Short-term Leverage 
 
 
5.10. Mean values of different patterns of leverage across different industries 
 
Total Leverage 
 
 
 
Long-term Leverage 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0426104   .0044875     9.50   0.000     .0338094    .0514115
_Iindustry_9     .0046145   .0081446     0.57   0.571    -.0113592    .0205881
_Iindustry_8    -.0041323   .0086198    -0.48   0.632    -.0210377    .0127732
_Iindustry_7    -.0274319   .0074997    -3.66   0.000    -.0421408   -.0127231
_Iindustry_6    -.0171694   .0068716    -2.50   0.013    -.0306464   -.0036925
_Iindustry_5    -.0081352   .0050196    -1.62   0.105    -.0179798    .0017095
_Iindustry_4     .0021982   .0072473     0.30   0.762    -.0120156     .016412
_Iindustry_3      .001164   .0052338     0.22   0.824    -.0091008    .0114287
_Iindustry_2     .0043099   .0058395     0.74   0.461    -.0071427    .0157626
                                                                              
        sole        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    5.93479731  1860  .003190751           Root MSE      =  .05605
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0155
    Residual    5.81796576  1852   .00314145           R-squared     =  0.0197
       Model    .116831553     8  .014603944           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,  1852) =    4.65
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1861
i.industry        _Iindustry_1-9      (_Iindustry_1 for ind~y==Basic Materials  omitted)
            Total     .23130014   .17638299        1861
                                                       
        Utilities     .43156309    .1871486          68
Telecommunication     .25665256   .20426965          58
       Technology     .06691631   .09010529          87
        Oil & Gas     .13044128   .09473032         116
     Industrials      .21853915   .15265039         621
      Health Care     .19869207   .12157277          97
Consumer Services     .31265543    .2064314         433
   Consumer Goods     .19974185   .14544516         225
 Basic Materials      .19203115   .12869036         156
                                                       
    Industry Name          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                         Summary of Total Leverage
            Total      .1928107   .16597295        1861
                                                       
        Utilities     .38433823   .17547738          68
Telecommunication     .21817443   .18955647          58
       Technology     .05173783   .08170097          87
        Oil & Gas     .10500041   .09231313         116
     Industrials       .1840639   .14823656         621
      Health Care     .15388352   .11497664          97
Consumer Services     .26888105   .19518389         433
   Consumer Goods     .15282151   .13292705         225
 Basic Materials      .14942078    .1063215         156
                                                       
    Industry Name          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                       Summary of Long-term Leverage
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Short-term Leverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Total     .03848945   .05648674        1861
                                                       
        Utilities     .04722486   .03663847          68
Telecommunication     .03847816   .04315684          58
       Technology     .01517848    .0334628          87
        Oil & Gas     .02544096   .03223658         116
     Industrials      .03447524    .0479568         621
      Health Care     .04480862   .06131884          97
Consumer Services     .04377437   .07704371         433
   Consumer Goods     .04692034     .050573         225
 Basic Materials      .04261041   .05576686         156
                                                       
    Industry Name          Mean   Std. Dev.       Freq.
                      Summary of Short-term Leverage
